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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, '. 
vs. : 
DENNIS ROSA-RE, : CaseNo.20070305-SC 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction of forcible sexual abuse, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (West 2004). State v. 
Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91U (Addendum A). This Court granted certiorari to review the 
court of appeals' holding that defendant failed to timely object to the selection of the jury. 
Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(5) & 78-2a-4 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the court of appeals correctly hold that defendant failed to timely raise a 
Bats on objection?1 
lA Batson objection is an objection that an opponent used some or all of its 
peremptory strikes to purposefully discriminate solely on the basis of race or gender "and 
as a result the empaneled jury is improperly composed." See State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 
39, ffi[ 1 n.l & 25, 140 P.3d 1219 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 416 U.S. 79 (1986) and 
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994)) (Addendum B). 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision 
for correctness. Whether a Batson objection is timely is a question of law. See Valdez, 2006 
UT 39, t i l . 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Batson's prohibition against purposeful discrimination injury selection is rooted in 
the Equal Protection Clause: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. Const, Art. 1, § 14 {Addendum F). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge & Conviction. Defendant was charged with forcible sexual abuse, a second 
degree felony, in violation of section 76-5-404, and child abuse, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (West 2004) (R. 1-3). Following a two-day jury 
trial, he was convicted of forcible sexual abuse, but acquitted of child abuse (R. 83-85,114-
116). He was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years imprisonment (R. 131-32; R147: 8-9). 
Jury Selection. Thirty-one persons reported for jury duty in the trial court (R. 78-79). 
Three men and seven women were removed for cause (id.). The remaining venire consisted 
of 11 men and 10 women (id.). Each party exercised four peremptory strikes. The 
prosecutor first peremptorily struck a male juror and defendant struck a male juror (id.). The 
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prosecutor next struck a female juror and defendant again struck a male juror (id.). The 
prosecutor then struck a male and defendant also struck a male (id.). For their fourth and 
final strikes, the prosecutor struck a male juror and defendant struck a Hispanic female juror 
(id.). As a result, each party struck three men and one woman, which resulted in a one-
man/seven-women empaneled jury. See Addendum E (Jury List). 
Just before the names of the selected jurors were announced, defense counsel 
approached the bench and engaged in a sidebar conference: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think given the seriousness of the charges we're 
probably going to need the record to make a Batson challenge. Just wanted to 
make everybody aware because of the sixteen perspective [sic] jurors that we 
had left after the for-causes, four were men, three were stricken by the state. 
(R164: 38).2 The prosecutor replied, "Come again?" (id.). Defense counsel said: "We had 
four potential male jurors and you struck three" (id.).3 After the prosecutor said, "Oh, well," 
defense counsel repeated, "So we just need the record" (id.). The court interjected, "So, [the 
defense] also struck a Hispanic too," just as the prosecutor commented, "Okay, well that 
wasn't intentional on my part" (id.). Defense counsel stated, "Well, we just need to make 
a record and go through the ...", at which point, the court responded, "Okay, alright, we can 
do that" (id.). See Addendum C (Sidebar Conference During Jury Selection). 
2Defense counsel's statement was inaccurate. After the for-cause challenges, 21 
jurors remained on the panel: 11 men and 10 women (R. 78-19). Seven of the 11 men 
were in the top group of 16 jurors (R. 78-79) (Add. E). 
3Again, the statement was inaccurate. The prosecutor struck three of seven men in 
the top group of 16 jurors and the defense struck another three men in the same group (R. 
78-79) {Add E). 
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The sidebar conference then ended (Add. C). 
In open court, the trial court announced the names of the selected jurors (R146: 38-
39). Defendant did not object to the announcement (id.). The court asked both counsel if 
these were the jurors the parties had selected; defense counsel affirmed they were and made 
no objection to the jurors' selection (id.). The court swore the empaneled jurors (R146: 39). 
Defendant did not object (id.). The court dismissed the remainder of the venire, including 
the three male jurors struck by the prosecutor (id.). Defendant again did not object (id.). 
The remainder of the venire was then dismissed (id.). 
After jury selection was complete, defense counsel for the first time "challenge[d] the 
jury that's selected" (R146: 39). And for the first time, defense counsel claimed that the 
prosecutor purposely discriminated against males in selecting the empaneled jury and 
demanded that the prosecutor provide "valid and verifiable reason[s] for each strike" (R146: 
39-40). The prosecutor again denied any discriminatory intent, noted that the defense had 
struck an equal number of males in addition to the Hispanic female, and volunteered to 
provide explanations for the strikes (R146: 40-41). See Addendum D (Batson Objection 
After Jury Selection & Trial Court Ruling). 
The trial court asked both counsel to explain their peremptory strikes, which counsel 
did (R146: 41-42). After considering the totality of the facts surrounding jury selection, the 
trial court found that the defense had failed to prove purposeful discrimination and sustained 
the prosecutor's peremptory strikes: 
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THE COURT: Well, I have reviewed my notes that I took during the jury voir 
dire. I've looked at the pattern and the way in which the peremptories were 
exercised by both sides. I do find that obviously it's a seven woman, one man 
jury, but based upon the reasons given and the conduct of both sides, I don't 
find a violation of Batson and the jury is constituted and the explanations 
given satisfy the Court that this jury may proceed. 
(R146: 42-43) {Add D). 
Appeal. Defendant did not challenge the validity of his conviction in the court of 
appeals. He claimed only that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson objection. See 
Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91U {Add. A). The court of appeals refused to reach the merits of 
the claim because it concluded that defendant had failed to timely raise and resolve his 
objection to the composition of the jury before jury selection was complete. See id. (citing 
Valdez, 2006 UT 39,1(47). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant's conviction is not at issue; 
therefore, the facts are only briefly summarized. 
Defendant had worked for a trucking company for only a few days when the 
company's owner invited defendant and a co-worker to spend the night at his home, because 
the three were leaving on a trip early the next morning (R146: 55, 100, 115, 117, 133-35). 
The two workers were to sleep in a room in the basement, next to the owner's fifteen-year-
old son's bedroom (R156: 50, 57). 
After the owner and his wife went to bed, the son, J.B., took the two workers to the 
basement bedroom. Defendant refused to sleep in the room and said he wanted to sleep in 
J.B.'s bed with J.B. (R146: 60, 74,93, 110). J.B. said "no," went into his own room, and lay 
down on his bed (R146: 61, 74-75, 93). 
Defendant came into J.B.'s room and also lay down on the bed (id.). J.B. ignored him 
and went to sleep. About two hours later, J.B. woke up when he felt "someone grab my 
body" and go "down my leg and grab[] my dick and my balls" and "touch[] it hard" (R146: 
61-63,91-92,104-05). J.B. opened his eyes. Defendanthad spread apart J.B.'s legs and was 
touching the boy's "dick" and "balls" under the boy's shorts, "skin-to-skin" (R146: 61-63, 
91-92). Defendant "pullfed] hard" on J.B.'s genitalia until the boy's penis "got hard" (id.). 
J.B. tried to sit up, but defendant hit him twice in the chest and pushed him back down 
(R146: 64, 77). Defendant threatened him: "Don't tell anyone, don't tell your mom or dad 
or I'll kill you if you tell" (R146: 62, 64). 
J.B. "choked up" and "watched the wall" until he could pull away from defendant and 
run upstairs to his parents' bedroom (R146: 64, 78). Their door was locked. He ran into his 
younger brother's bedroom and got into bed (R146: 64, 119). 
Defendant came upstairs, knocked on the parents' bedroom door, and said he was 
ready to leave (R146: 65, 105). After the men left, J.B. told his mother what had happened, 
and the police were contacted (R146: 65, 67, 79, 104-07). When arrested, defendant 
admitted that he was in bed with J.B., but denied touching him (R146: 125-26, 131). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that he timely raised & Batson objection during a sidebar conference 
before jury selection was complete. The court of appeals correctly held that he did not. This 
Court should affirm the court of appeals. 
A Batson objection "amounts to a statement that the opposing litigant's use of 
peremptory challenges violates [the Equal Protection Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and as a result the empaneled jury is improperly composed." State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, 
% 25, 140 P.3d 1219. Like all jury objections, a Batson objection is subject to the 
contemporaneous objection rule. That rule generally requires that to preserve an issue, a trial 
objection must be made "in clear and concise terms and in a timely fashion calculated to 
obtain a ruling thereon." Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984). 
In the context of Batson, "clear and concise terms" mandate an allegation that an 
opponent used a peremptory strike to purposefully discriminate against an identified juror 
solely because of the juror's race or gender and, as a result, the empaneled jury was 
unconstitutionally selected in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and cannot be sworn. 
"Timely" requires that the objection be made before the jury is sworn and the remainder of 
the venire dismissed. The contemporaneous objection rule also requires that the objection 
be presented in a "fashion calculated to obtain a ruling." In the context of Batson, this means 
that the objection must be made and resolved while a remedy is still available. 
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According to defendant, a litigant raising a Batson claim objects only to his 
opponent's strike, not to the empaneled jury. See Brief of Appellant at 15. This misconstrues 
the constitutional interests that equal protection protects and the constitutional violation that 
Batson remedies. 
A litigant raising a Batson objection does not merely object to his opponent's 
peremptory strike; he objects to the composition of the empaneled jury. In so doing, he not 
only asserts his own constitutional right to be tried by a fairly selected jury, but also the 
constitutional right of the individual juror to fairly participate injury service. Violation of 
these dual rights is remedied only when an unconstitutionally selected jury is re-composed 
into a fairly selected jury. This is done only by reinstating the wrongfully stricken juror. 
Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^ j 16-21, 26 & 33 n.19. Reinstatement can occur, however, only if a 
Batson objection is articulated and resolved before jury selection is complete—that is, before 
the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed. Consequently, a Batson objection is "calculated 
to obtain a ruling," and thereby an appropriate remedy, only when the litigant objects to the 
unfairly empaneled jury being sworn and to the wrongfully stricken juror being dismissed. 
Here, defendant failed to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule. During 
the sidebar conference, defense counsel vaguely stated his intention to raise a Batson 
objection at some point in the proceedings. He also asserted that the prosecutor used strikes 
against males. Counsel's statements did not amount to a Batson objection. Defense counsel 
did not allege that the prosecutor's intent in exercising the strikes was to discriminate, nor 
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did he allege that the strikes resulted in an unconstitutionally selected jury. Most 
significantly, counsel did not seek reinstatement of the stricken jurors. Nor did he object 
when the selected jurors were announced, the empaneled jury was sworn, or the remainder 
of the venire was dismissed. In sum, defendant "sandbagged" until after jury selection was 
complete and no cure was available. Only then did he object to the composition of the 
empaneled sworn jury. By then, defendant's Batson objection was untimely and 
consideration of its merits was waived. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT DEFENDANT 
FAILED TO TIMELY OBJECT TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE 
EMPANELED JURY PURSUANT TO BATSON 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits purposeful 
discrimination injury selection on the basis of mce, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), 
or gender, J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). See State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, \ 1 
n.l, 140 P.3d 1219 {Addendum B). Under Batson and its progeny, a litigant may object to 
an opponent's peremptory strike as purposefully discriminatory. Valdez, id. Commonly 
referred to as & Batson objection, whether based on race or gender, the objection "is not itself 
a peremptory challenge, but rather an objection to an opposing litigant's improper use of 
peremptory challenges." Id. at f 25 (emphasis in original). "A litigant who raises a Batson 
challenge is objecting that the 'jury was improperly constituted due to an equal protection 
violation.'" Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991)). "In other words, a 
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Batson challenge amounts to a statement that the opposing litigant's use of peremptory 
challenges violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and as a result the empaneled jury is 
improperly composed." Id. 
Like all objections to jury selection, a Batson objection is subject to the 
contemporaneous objection rule. See Fa/flfez,2006UT39,^[36-38 (recognizing that Batson 
and other objections to the jury are subject to the same procedural rules); State v. King, 2006 
UT 3, Tffl 15-18, 131 P.3d 202 (recognizing that the "unique attributes" of jury selection 
compel strict adherence to the contemporaneous objection rule). The contemporaneous 
objection rule requires that to preserve consideration of an issue for appeal, a trial objection 
must be articulated in "clear and concise terms and in a timely fashion calculated to obtain 
a ruling thereon." Barson v. RR. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984). In the 
case of Batson, this requires a litigant to articulate—before the jury is sworn and the 
remainder of the venire is dismissed—that strikes were purposefully used to discriminate and 
as result the empaneled jury was unfairly selected in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
and may not be sworn until the wrongfully stricken juror is reinstated. See Valdez, 2006 UT 
39, fflf 23 & 44 (recognizing these components of a Batson objection, but not articulating 
them as requirements). 
Here, defendant claims that he complied with the contemporaneous objection rule 
when he allegedly made a Batson objection during a sidebar conference before the jury was 
sworn and the remainder of the venire dismissed. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt] at 13-15. 
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The court of appeals correctly held that defendant's objection was not timely and refused to 
reach its merits. See State v. Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91U {Addendum A). This Court should 
affirm that decision. 
A. Strict Adherence to the Contemporaneous Objection Rule Is 
Especially Important for a Batson Objection Because the Litigant 
Is Asserting Not Only his Own Right to Be Tried by a Fairly 
Selected Jury, but Also the Stricken Juror's Right to Fairly 
Participate in the Jury Process. 
Batson, like other objections to jury selection, is "as dependent on the procedural 
safeguards of the adversarial system, if not more so, as the remainder of the trial." King, 
2006 UT 3, T| 16 (in context of juror bias objections). Accord Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ffif 39 & 
43 -44. Examination of the unique dual interest a litigant has when raising a Batson obj ection 
establishes the need for strict adherence to the contemporaneous objection rule. 
Resolution of a Batson claim involves a three-step inquiry, identical to that used to 
resolve equal protection claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Johnson 
v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 171 n.7 (2005) (reaffirming Title VII analysis as the proper 
framework for a Batson claim); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768-69 (1995) (applying 
Title VII analysis to a Batson claim); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 & 364 
(1991) (same); Batson, 476 U.S. at 85, 89 & 94-98 (same). Accord Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ffif 
14-15 (recognizing the similar evidentiary frameworks of Batson and Title VII analysis). In 
the context of a criminal defendant's challenge, those steps are: 
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First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a 
prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on 
the basis of race [or gender]. 
Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to 
present a race-[or gender-] neutral explanation for striking the juror in 
question. Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason, "the 
second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, 
or even plausible"; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it 
suffices. 
Third, the court must then determine whether the defendant has carried 
his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This final step involves 
evaluating "the persuasiveness of the justification" proffered by the prosecutor, 
but "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial [or gender] motivation 
rests with, and never shifts from the opponent of the strike." 
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006) (quoting Batson and Purkett) (internal citations 
omitted and paragraphing added). 
If, in step three, the trial court finds that purposeful discrimination resulted in an 
unconstitutionally empaneled jury, the composition of the unfairly selected jury must be 
changed through reinstatement of the wrongfully stricken juror. See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, 
fflf 33 n.19 & 44. Occasionally, for example, if discrimination taints the entire panel, 
reinstatement may be insufficient to remedy the violation and a mistrial may be warranted. 
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24. 
Requiring reinstatement of a wrongfully stricken juror is consistent with the important 
constitutional interests at stake in fair jury selection. "Litigants are constitutionally entitled 
to have their case tried by a jury that is selected by fair and nondiscriminatory methods." 
Valdez, 2006 UT 39, Tj 17. Likewise, the community at large "has an interest in fair jury 
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selection procedures." Id. Finally, "the individual jurors themselves have a right to 
nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures." Id. The general interests in a fairly selected 
jury and in a fair jury process are satisfied whenever a jury is in fact fairly selected. Thus, 
when a Batson violation occurs, the litigant's and the community's constitutional interests 
can be remedied either through reinstatement of the stricken juror or through mistrial, 
because, in either case, the outcome is a fairly selected jury. 
The constitutional interest of the individual juror is more unique than those of the 
litigant and the community. A juror who has been illegally struck based on race or gender 
is "subjected to open and public . . . discrimination," Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 
49 (1999), and "suffers a profound personal humiliation heightened by its public character," 
Powers, 499 U.S. at 413. Thus, declaring a mistrial and "commencing the jury selection 
process anew does not really correct the error." State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo. 
1992) (en banc). In the case mistrial, the "defendant is simply accorded a new opportunity 
to obtain a jury composed according to . . . neutral criterion," while the "discrimination 
endured by the excluded venirepersons goes completely unredressed since they remain 
wrongfully excluded from jury service." Id. A violation of an individual juror's 
constitutional right, therefore, is "cured" only when the illegally stricken juror is reinstated 
on the jury. See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^ f 25. This can occur only if the Batson objection is 
raised and resolved while that remedy is still available—before the empaneled jury is sworn 
and the remainder of the venire is dismissed. See id. at ^} 17, 33 n. 19 & 40 (recognizing 
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importance of this remedy and its availability only before jury is sworn and venire 
dismissed); Rosa-Re, 2007 UT 91U (holding that objection must be raised and resolved 
before jury is sworn and venire dismissed). 
In light of "the importance of [the individual juror's] right and the difficulties that 
wrongfully excluded jurors face in remedying a violation of this right themselves," litigants 
raising Batson objections are granted unique "third-party standing to assert the rights of 
wrongfully struck jurors on their behalf." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, \ 17 n. 12 (citing McCollum, 
505 U.S. at 55-56, and Powers, 499 U.S. at 413-15)). In this dual capacity, a litigant 
claiming a Batson violation asserts not only a violation of his own constitutional right to a 
fairly selected jury, but also asserts a violation of the stricken juror's constitutional right to 
fairly participate. See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^ 25. Like other "unique attributes of jury 
selection," the litigant's dual role requires strict adherence to the contemporaneous objection 
rule if the individual juror's right, as well as the litigant's, is to be protected. See id. 
(recognizing importance of this dual role); King, 2006 UT 3, f^ 15-16 (recognizing 
importance of contemporaneous objection rule injury selection). See also Powers, 499 U.S. 
at 414 (commenting that third-party standing is appropriate because "there can be no doubt 
that [the litigant] will be a motivated, effective advocate for the excluded venirepersons' 
rights" in that both have an equal interest in eliminating discrimination in jury selection). 
Accordingly, a litigant must clearly and concisely articulate a Batson objection in a timely 
14 
fashion calculated to ensure that if the objection is sustained, the wrongfully stricken juror 
will be reinstated. 
Here, defendant concedes, as he must, that a Batson objection is untimely unless it is 
raised before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed. See Br.Aplt. at 8 (citing Valdez, 
2006 UT 39). He claims that he met this requirement during the sidebar conference. See 
Br.Aplt. at 13-15. But, as will be discussed, defendant's argument ignores the requirements 
of the contemporaneous objection rule and misapprehends Batson'§ policy and purpose. 
Defense counsel's sidebar statements did not amount to a clear and concise allegation of an 
equal protection violation and were not fashioned in a manner calculated to obtain a timely 
ruling. Moreover, in the sidebar conference, no objection was made to the empaneled jury. 
To the contrary, without having articulated the grounds for an equal protection violation and 
without seeking a resolution of his claimed Batson objection, defendant allowed the jury to 
be sworn and the remainder of the venire to be dismissed. Because defendant failed to 
timely articulate or resolve the Batson issue during jury selection, the court of appeals 
correctly held that the issue was not preserved. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91U. 
B. The Contemporaneous Objection Rule Required Defendant to 
Clearly and Concisely Allege that the Prosecutor Purposefully Used 
His Peremptory Strikes to Discriminate and, as a Result, the 
Empaneled Jury Was Unconstitutionally Selected and Should Not 
Be Sworn. 
Batson was referenced at two points in the proceedings below. The first instance was 
in the sidebar conference during the jury selection process, before the jury was sworn and the 
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remainder of the venire dismissed. See Statement of the Case & Addendum C. Defendant 
claims that this was a timely Batson objection. See Br.Aplt. at 13-15. In fact, no proper 
Batson objection was made. 
Following the sidebar conference, the empaneled jury was sworn and the remainder 
of the venire dismissed. After the sworn jurors and the remainder of the venire left the 
courtroom, a second discussion ofBatson occurred. See Statement of the Case & Addendum 
D. According to defendant, the second discussion was a continuation of the original sidebar 
objection and occurred only because the trial court erroneously delayed ruling on the sidebar 
objection until after jury selection was complete. See Br.Aplt. at 16 & 19. In fact, this 
discussion represents the first time defendant articulated a Batson objection, thus the 
objection was untimely. 
An examination of the two discussions establishes that defendant failed to comply 
with the contemporaneous objection rule and, therefore, as the court of appeals correctly 
held, failed to preserve his Batson claim. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91U (Add. A). 
Following the parties' exercise of their peremptory strikes, the trial court announced 
its intention to name the selected jurors (R164: 38). Defense counsel asked to approach the 
bench. At sidebar, defense counsel stated, "we're probably going to need the record to make 
a Batson challenge" (id.). He inaccurately continued, "just wanted to make everybody 
aware" that the prosecutor struck three of four men in the top sixteen listed jurors (id.).4 
4See Statement of the Case, supra, & ns.2 & 3. 
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When the prosecutor voiced confusion over counsel's statements, defense counsel repeated, 
"We had four potential male jurors and you struck three... So we just need the record55 (id.). 
Apparently, the court was also unsure of the point defense counsel was trying to make and 
commented, "So, you also struck a Hispanic too55 (id.). Defense counsel responded, "Well, 
we just need to make a record and go through the . . . " (id.). The court interrupted, "Okay, 
alright, we can do that55; defense counsel said only, "Okay55 (id.). See Add. C. 
While the sidebar exchange indicates that the defense intended to raise a Batson 
objection at some point in the proceedings, it does not establish that a Batson objection was 
articulated before the jury was sworn. At most, defense counsel requested the record 
("probably going to need,55 "just wanted to make everyone aware55) based on an obviously 
incorrect assertion that the prosecutor struck three of only four men on the venire. See Add, 
E (Jury List: establishing that 11 men remained after the for-cause challenges, seven of 
whom were grouped in the first 16 jurors; three of these seven were struck by the prosecutor 
and another three were struck by the defense). 
This Court has summarized what constitutes a Batson objection: 
[A] Batson challenge amounts to a statement that the opposing litigant's use 
of peremptory challenges violates [the Equal Protection Clause of] the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and as a result the empaneled jury is improperly 
composed. 
Valdez, 2006 UT 39, \ 25. See also Powers, 499 U.S. at 412-13 (recognizing that a Batson 
objection is a challenge to "[t]he composition of the trier of fact55); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 
411,420 n.5 (1991) (recognizing that a Batson objection is an objection to "the selection of 
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an objecting defendant's own jury"). Defense counsel's generalized declaration that 
unidentified males were struck is not a clear and concise allegation of an equal protection 
violation. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143 & n.l6 (recognizing that Batson does not preclude 
strikes that disproportionately impact one gender more than the other as long as the strikes 
are not intentionally discriminatory); Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (White, J., concurring) (noting 
that "it is not unconstitutional, without more, to strike one or more blacks from a jury"); 
Herman v. State, 821 P.2d457,458 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that a disparate result does not 
establish an equal protection violation, which requires an "intentional and deliberate" 
discriminatory plan). Rather, a Batson objection requires an allegation that (1) a peremptory 
strike was purposefully used to discriminate against a specific juror solely because of the 
juror's race or gender and that as a result, (2) the empaneled jury was unconstitutionally 
selected and may not be sworn until (3) the wrongfully excluded juror is properly reinstated. 
See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^ 25 & 33 n.l9 (recognizing these components of a Batson 
objection, but not articulating them as requirements). 
Moreover, as will be discussed, the contemporaneous objection rule requires an 
objection to be fashioned in a manner calculated to obtain a ruling. This necessarily requires 
the availability of a viable remedy. In the context of Batson, a defendant cannot claim that 
the empaneled jury is unconstitutionally composed, and yet not object when that same jury 
is sworn. Nor can a defendant claim that a stricken juror should be reinstated, and yet allow 
that juror and the remainder of the venire to be dismissed. Unless a defendant is required to 
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object to swearing of the unfairly empaneled jury and to the dismissal of the illegally 
excluded jurors, a defendant can "sandbag" aBatson violation by raising but not seeking the 
resolution of the objection until after jury selection is complete, and thereby unfairly plant 
potential reversible error. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, % 14, 128 P.3d 1171 (refusing 
to review the adequacy of the jury voir dire objection where Winfield "affirmatively 
represented to the[ trial] court that he had no objection to the jury panel"). See also Allen 
v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319,327 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a defendant waives zBatson violation 
by not objecting to the empaneled jury). 
C. The Contemporaneous Objection Rule Required Defendant to Seek 
a Timely Ruling, and Thereby a Curative Remedy, by Objecting to 
the Jury Being Sworn and the Remainder of the Venire Being 
Dismissed. 
After the sidebar conference ended, the trial court announced the names of the 
selected jurors (R164: 38). Defendant did not object (id.). The court then asked counsel if 
those named constituted the selected jurors (R146: 38-39). Defense counsel affirmed they 
were and did not object to their selection (id.). The court swore in the empaneled jury (id). 
Again, defense counsel did not object (id.). The court dismissed the remainder of the venire, 
including the males stricken by the prosecutor (id.). Defense counsel did not object (id.). 
Only after members of the venire were either sworn or excused, did defense counsel for the 
first time "challenge the jury that's selected" and allege that the prosecutor purposefully 
discriminated against men in exercising his peremptory strikes (R146: 39-40). See Add. D. 
As discussed, supra, a litigant objecting to the selection of the jury on equal protection 
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grounds asserts not his own right to a fairly selected jury, but also the right of the individual 
juror to be fairly included in the jury selection process. To ensure protection of these dual 
constitutional rights, this Court adopted a bright line rule that a Batson objection must be 
articulated before the jury is sworn and the remainder of the venire is dismissed. See Valdez, 
2006 UT 39. This ensures that a Batson objection is only raised and resolved when a 
curative remedy (reinstatement of the wrongfully stricken juror) is still available. See Rosa-
Jte,2007UTApp91U. 
Defendant disputes this view of Batson. According to defendant, a litigant raising a 
Batson objection objects only to the opponent's strike, and not to the selection of a juror or 
the empaneled jury. See Br.Aplt. at 15. Consequently, he seeks modification of Valdez and 
reversal of Rosa-Re. See Br.Aplt. at 20-24. 
Defendant claims that to preserve a Batson claim, a litigant need only object to a 
strike. Once this objection is lodged, the litigant has no obligation to further object. See 
Br.Aplt. at 14-15 & 18-19. Defendant asserts that the litigant need not object to the selection 
of the empaneled jury, to the jury being sworn, or to the remainder of the venire being 
dismissed. See id. at 15-18. Instead, according to defendant, once an objection to a strike 
is made, the burden of resolving the Batson issue rests entirely on the trial court. See 
Br.Aplt. at 14-20. Though defendant professes that this burden "shifts" to the trial court only 
when the objection amounts to a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, see 
Br.Aplt. at 21-22, defendant's application of his proposed rule to the facts of this case 
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requires much less. Here, defendant asserts that the court was obligated to immediately rule 
once Batson was mentioned at sidebar.5 See Br.Aplt. at 11-12. 
This Court has discounted the approach advocated by defendant. In Valdez, this Court 
re-examined its decision in Redd v. Negley, 785 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1989), in which an 
objection to the jury was delayed until after jury selection was complete. Valdez, 2006 UT 
39, ^ 33. Redd lodged a vague objection to the composition of the jury in a sidebar 
conference before the jury was sworn and the venire dismissed. Id. (citing Redd, 785 P.2d 
at 1099-1100). Following the sidebar conference, Redd passed the jury for cause conditioned 
upon his right to argue the objection after the jury was sworn. Id. (citing Redd). When Redd 
then attempted to argue the objection after jury selection was complete, the trial court ruled 
the objection untimely and refused to consider its merits. Id. In Redd's appeal, the Court 
5In Batson, the burden of evidentiary production shifts to the prosecutor after the 
defendant makes a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination (step one). See 
discussion, supra, at 12. Contrary to defendant's assertion, see Br.Aplt. at 11-12, the shift 
does not occur automatically; the trial court must first rule that step one is satisfied. See 
Rice, 546 U.S. at 338. A prosecutor may waive this requirement, however, by 
volunteering neutral explanations (step two) before the trial court makes a step one ruling. 
See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. 
Here, Batson's burden-shifting and other aspects of the substantive inquiry are not 
before the Court; certiorari review is limited to timeliness. Resolution of the timeliness 
issue is governed by the contemporaneous objection rule, which requires a trial court to 
rule only if a specific and timely objection is made. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, U 
15, 164 P.3d 366 (recognizing that "merely mentioning" an issue is insufficient to compel 
a ruling by the trial court); State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,133, 122 P.3d 543 (same). See 
also Doe v. Burham, 6 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that a judge is not 
compelled to invoke Batson if no objection is raised). 
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split over the nature of the objection—whether it was "an objection that there was not a 
proportionate number of minority jurors on the petit jury" or "an obj ection to the composition 
of the jury venire or to the defense's use of peremptory challenges"—but agreed that Redd's 
objection, whatever its nature, was timely because it was raised before the jury was sworn. 
Id. (citing Redd, 785 P.2d at 1100-04). 
This Court in Valdez distinguished Redd: 
We note that this procedure [in Redd], whereby an objection was made prior 
to the swearing of the jury but not addressed by the court until after the jury 
was sworn in and dismissed, will generally not meet the standard we set forth 
today. A Batson challenge must be raised both before the jury is sworn and 
before the venire is dismissed in order to allow the trial court to adequately 
remedy a Batson violation if one has occurred.. . . Obviously, if the grounds 
for the Batson challenge are not articulated until after the jury has been sworn 
and the remainder of the venire is dismissed, the trial court cannot cure a 
Batson violation. 
Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f^ 33 n. 19 (Add. B). In Rosa-Re, the court of appeals relied on Valdez's 
analysis ofRedd'to hold that "in order to be timely, the grounds for a Batson challenge must 
be raised and addressed by the trial court prior to the swearing in of the jury and the dismissal 
of the venire." Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91U (Add. A). 
Defendant claims that the court of appeals "misapprehended" Valdez. He argues that 
Valdez "should not be construed to mean that the defendant is responsible for resolving [a 
Batson] objection before the jury is sworn [but] should be read to place the responsibility of 
addressing/resolving an objection on the trial court." Br.Aplt. at 22 & 23-24. 
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Defendant's argument begs the question. A trial court is obligated to promptly rule 
on an objection only if it is properly articulated and timely presented in compliance with the 
contemporaneous objection rule. See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982). 
A court is not obligated to address an objection which has not been raised. See Cruz, 2005 
UT 45, T[ 36 (holding that court was not obligated to address an issue mentioned by counsel, 
but not articulated or argued with any specificity); State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 14, 10 
P.3d 346 (same). This is especially true in the case of jury selection. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, fflf 31-33,12 P.3d 92 ("It is generally inappropriate for a trial court 
to interfere with counsel's conscious choices in the jury selection process, notwithstanding 
the existence of a reasonable basis for objecting to those jurors."). See also Doe, 6 F.3d at 
481 (recognizing that a judge is not compelled "to invoke Batson when a party has never 
objected on that basis") 
In this case, defendant articulated no equal protection violation during the sidebar 
conference. At most, he stated that he would "probably" need the record to make a Batson 
objection. He then did not object to the selected jurors, did not object when those jurors were 
sworn, and did not object when the remainder of the venire was dismissed. Only after "no 
remedy short of aborting the trial" was possible, did defendant allege that the prosecutor had 
engaged in purposeful discrimination and object to the composition of the empaneled jury 
(R146: 39-41). See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, % 44 n.22 (citation and internal quotation marks 
23 
omitted). But even then, defendant did not argue that the allegedly wrongfully stricken jurors 
should be reinstated; in fact, he did not advocate any particular outcome: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, I think the record has been made, Your Honor, 
I think at this point the Court simply needs to decide either to uphold the panel 
or strike the panel We're satisfied with whatever the Court's decision is. 
(R146: 42) (Add. D). 
Defense counsel's lackadaisical response reveals why he did not articulate a Batson 
objection or seek its resolution before the jury was sworn and the venire dismissed. As 
discussed, supra, when & Batson objection is raised and ruled upon during jury selection, the 
cure for a violation is simple and effective. The wrongfully stricken juror is reinstated on the 
jury and the trial proceeds with a fairly selected jury. See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^ f 44 & n.22. 
In contrast, when, as here, the Batson objection is not articulated or resolved until jury 
selection is complete, the only remedy available is mistrial, a remedy which does not cure the 
actual discrimination that has occurred. See id. 
Significantly, mistrial also typically advantages the litigant making the Batson 
objection. Here, for example, the prosecution's witnesses were present and their testimony 
would clearly establish defendant's guilt. Yet, defendant was able to create a "win-win" 
situation for himself by waiting until jury selection was complete before articulating his 
objection to the empaneled jury. At that point, if the objection had been sustained, a mistrial 
would have been declared and defendant's conviction delayed. On the other hand, the denial 
of the objection still benefitted defendant because he now had planted potential automatic 
24 
reversible error in an otherwise unassailable case. See State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 459 
(Utah App.) (recognizing that automatic reversal results if a Batson denial is reversed on 
appeal), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). By planting potential error, defendant 
secured the "opportunity to test his fortunes with the first jury, [while] preserving the 
opportunity for . . . a second round in the event of conviction." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^ 39 
& 44 n.22. Defendant candidly revealed this strategy when after the jury was sworn and the 
venire dismissed, he stated that he would be "satisfied" no matter what the trial court 
ultimately ruled. 
"Batson is designed to vindicate and encouragef] 'prompt rulings . . . without 
substantial disruption of the jury selection process.'" Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172-73 (quoting 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59). That purpose is easily met when a Batson objection is 
timely raised. The Rosa-Re decision correctly interpreted "timely raised" to require 
defendant to articulate and resolve his Batson objection before the jury was sworn and the 
venire dismissed. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91U (citing Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ffif 33 n.19 
& 43 (Add. A). 
Though defendant claims that Rosa-Re imposes an unfair obligation on him to seek 
a court ruling, see Br.Aplt. at 20-24, it does not. It merely requires a litigant raising a Batson 
objection to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule by clearing and concisely 
articulating grounds for the objection in a fashion calculated to obtain a timely ruling. In 
other words, the litigant must clearly and concisely assert that (1) a peremptory strike was 
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purposefully used to discriminate against a specific juror solely because of the juror's race 
or gender and that as a result, (2) the empaneled jury was unconstitutionally selected and may 
not be sworn until (3) the wrongfully excluded juror is properly reinstated. Only in this 
manner will the objection, if sustained, achieve whatBatson intended: the protection of the 
litigant's right to be tried by a fairly selected jury, the community's right to a fair jury 
selection system, and the individual juror's right to fairly participate injury service. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm the 
Rosa-Re decision and defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this j*j_^-day of January, 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attomey^j^neraTx 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
DAVIS, Judge: 
*1 Defendant Dennis Rosa-Re appeals his 
conviction for forcible sexual abuse, a second 
degree felony. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 
(2003). We affirm. 
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the 
State improperly exercised its peremptory 
challenges to remove males from the jury in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution, seeU.S. Const, amend, 
XIV, § 1; Batson v. Kentucky, 416 U.S. 79, 89 
(1986); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 
146 (1994) (holding that "the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on 
the basis of gender"); State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, 
%\ 13-19, 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing history of 
Batson challenges). The State argues that 
Defendant's Batson challenge was untimely because 
it was not raised and addressed by the trial court 
before the jury was sworn and the venire dismissed. 
We agree. The question of whether Defendant's " 
Batson challenge was timely raised is a question of 
law," which we review for correctness. Valdez, 
2006UT39atT[ll. 
In State v. Valdez, the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that "a Batson challenge must be raised 
before the jury is sworn and before the remainder of 
the venire has been excused in order to be timely 
under Utah law.'VJ. at f^ 47.In reaching its holding, 
the supreme court noted that the situation in Redd v. 
Negley, 785 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1989), 
whereby an objection was made prior to the 
swearing of the jury but not addressed by the court 
until after the jury was sworn in and dismissed, will 
generally not meet the standard we set forth today. 
A Batson challenge must be raised both before the 
jury is sworn and before the venire is dismissed.... 
Obviously, if the grounds for the Batson challenge 
are not articulated until after the jury has been 
sworn and the remainder of the venire is dismissed, 
the trial court cannot cure a Batson violation. 
Valdez, 2006 UT 39 at \ 33 n. 19. Thus, in order 
to be timely, the grounds for a Batson challenge 
must be raised and addressed by the trial court prior 
to the swearing in of the jury and the dismissal of 
the venire. See also Mooney v. State, 105 P .3d 149, 
153 (Alaska Ct.App.2005) (aligning Alaska courts " 
with the courts that require defendants to raise 
Batson challenges before the remaining members of 
the jury venire are released and the jury is sworn"); 
State v. Parrish, 111 P.3d 671, 674 (Mont.2005) (" 
[C]ounsel must raise a Batson challenge before the 
district court swears the jury and dismisses the 
venire."); see also Gaskin v. State, 873 So.2d 965, 
968 (Miss.2004). 
The rationale for such a bright line rule is clear. " 
[A] Batson challenge must be raised in such a 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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manner that the trial court is able to fashion a 
remedy in the event a Batson violation has occurred. 
"Valdez, 2006 UT 39 at 1f 44. Otherwise, "to allow 
a Batson challenge to proceed after the venire has 
been dismissed is only to sanction abuse."M 
Furthermore, the rule requiring "that a Batson 
challenge be raised [and ruled upon] both before the 
jury is sworn and before the venire is dismissed, 
efficiently allows the trial court to determine the 
issues the Batson test is designed to resolve.'Vd. at 
If 43. 
*2 Here, Defendant's trial counsel failed to 
conclude a Batson challenge prior to the 
empaneling of the jury. In a sidebar conference, 
trial counsel stated "we're probably going to need 
the record to make a Batson challenge.... [B]ecause 
of the sixteen perspective [sic] jurors that we had 
left after the for-causes, four were men, three were 
stricken by the [S]tate."After the brief sidebar 
discussion, the trial court read the names of the 
jurors, and both Defendant's trial counsel and the 
prosecutor affirmed that these jurors made up the 
jury that they had selected. The trial court then 
swore in the jury and released the remaining 
members of the venire. Other than raising the Batson 
issue in the side-bar conference, Defendant's trial 
counsel never objected to the makeup of the jury. 
After the swearing in of the jury and release of the 
venire, Defendant's trial counsel then argued his 
Batson challenge, which the trial court denied. 
Defendant's Batson challenge falls squarely within 
the holding and reasoning of Valdez. Defendant 
failed to resolve his objection to the makeup of the 
jury "before the jury [was] sworn and before the 
remainder of the venire ha[d] been excused."/^, at 
Tf 47.As such, Defendant's Batson challenge was 
untimely, and we need not reach the merits of his 
claim. We therefore affirm Defendant's conviction. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Presiding 
Judge and CAROLYN B. McHUGH, Judge. 
Utah App.,2007. 
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H 
State v. Valdez 
Utah,2006. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Anthony James VALDEZ, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 20040633. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
District Court, Third District, Salt Lake 
Department, Judith S. Atherton, J., of aggravated 
burglary, possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, and criminal mischief. Defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, 95 P.3d 291, 
reversed and remanded. 
Holding: On grant of State's petition for writ of 
certiorari, the Supreme Court, Durham, C.J., held 
that in order to be timely, a Batson challenge must 
be raised before the jury is sworn and before the 
remainder of the venire is dismissed. 
Decision of Court of Appeals reversed; remanded 
for consideration of remaining claims. 
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burden of establishing a race-neutral reason for the 
strike for purposes of Batson claim by simply 
denying a discriminatory motive or professing good 
faith; rather, the proponent must proffer 
justifications that are: (1) neutral, (2) related to the 
particular case to be tried, (3) reasonably specific 
and clear, and (4) legitimate. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
[7] Jury 230 €=>33(5.15) 
230 Jury 
23 Oil Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of Right 
230k33 Constitution and Selection of Jury 
230k33(5) Challenges and Objections 
230k33(5.15) k. Peremptory 
Challenges. Most Cited Cases 
If the proponent of a peremptory strike provides a 
sufficient race-neutral explanation for the strike for 
purposes of Batson claim, the trial court must 
determine whether the opponent of the strike has 
proven purposeful discrimination. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
[8] Jury 230 €=>H7 
230 Jury 
230V Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and 
Objections 
230kll4 Challenge to Panel or Array, and 
Motion to Quash Venire 
230kl 17 k. Time. Most Cited Cases 
Rule of criminal procedure providing that a 
challenge to an individual juror may be made only 
before the jury is sworn to try the action, except the 
court may, for good cause, permit it to be made 
after the jury is sworn but before any of the 
evidence is presented, has no applicability to an 
objection made to composition of the empaneled 
jury, and thus does not govern Batson challenges. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Rules of Crim.Proc, 
Rule 18(c)(2). 
[9] Constitutional Law 92 €=>3309 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVI Equal Protection 
92XXVI(B) Particular Classes 
92XXVI(B)8 Race, National Origin, or 
Ethnicity 
92k3305 Juries 
92k3309 k. Peremptory Challenges. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k221(4)) 
A litigant who raises a Batson challenge is 
objecting that the jury was improperly constituted 
due to an equal protection violation. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
[10] Jury 230 €==>117 
230 Jury 
230V Competency of Jurors, Challenges, and 
Objections 
230kll4 Challenge to Panel or Array, and 
Motion to Quash Venire 
230kl 17 k. Time. Most Cited Cases 
In order to be timely, a Batson challenge must be 
raised before the jury is sworn and before the 
remainder of the venire is dismissed. West's U.C.A. 
§ 78-46-16; Rules of Crim.Proc, Rule 18(c)(1)(h). 
*t220 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christine Soltis 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Byron F. Burmester, Salt Lake 
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City, for petitioner. 
John D. O'Connell, Jr., Lori Seppi, Salt Lake City, 
for respondent. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
1f 1 In this opinion, we clarify an important 
procedural rule that has apparently caused some 
confusion in Utah's lower courts. The issues in this 
case arise from the State's use of its peremptory 
challenges to exclude female potential jurors from 
the jury at the trial of Anthony James Valdez. 
Valdez objected, arguing that the State's use of its 
peremptory challenges was unconstitutional under 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 
90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).FN1 However, Valdez did 
not raise his Batson challenge until after the trial 
jury had been empaneled and sworn in and the 
remainder of the venire dismissed. We accepted 
certiorari to consider whether Valdez's Batson 
challenge was timely under these circumstances.FN2 
FN1. In Batson v. Kentucky, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a 
prosecutor's use of racially motivated 
peremptory challenges violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 
1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The 
Supreme Court has since extended the 
reasoning of Batson to the use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors 
solely on the basis of gender. See J.E.B. 
v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146, 114 S.Ct. 
1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) ( "[T]he 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
discrimination in jury selection on the 
basis of gender...."). Thus, Valdez's 
challenge to the State's allegedly improper 
use of its peremptory challenges 
technically falls under J.E.B. However, in 
light of the Supreme Court's increasing 
jurisprudence in this area, an objection to 
an opponent's use of peremptory 
challenges brought under the Equal 
Protection Clause is now generally referred 
to as a uBatson challenge." See, e.g., 
State v. Parrish, 2005 MT 112, \ 13, 327 
Mont. 88, If 13, 111 P.3d 671, 674, \ 13 
(referring to a defendant's objection to the 
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges 
to exclude men from the jury as a "Batson 
challenge"). Therefore, we refer to 
Valdez's challenge as a Batson challenge. 
FN2. We granted certiorari in this case on 
two issues: (1) whether a Batson challenge 
may be deemed timely if the jury has been 
sworn and the remainder of the venire 
excused; and (2) whether the court of 
appeals applied the correct criteria for a 
Batson analysis and the correct standard of 
review on appeal. Because our holding on 
the first issue is dispositive, we do not 
reach the second. 
f 2 We hold that a Batson challenge is only timely 
if raised both before the jury is sworn and before 
the remainder of the venire is excused. Under 
firmly established Utah law, a Batson challenge is 
only timely if it is raised before the jury is sworn. 
We take the opportunity provided by this case to 
clarify that a Batson objection must also be raised 
before the venire is dismissed. Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
BACKGROUND 
\ 3 Valdez was prosecuted in district court on five 
charges: aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, 
child abuse, possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, and criminal mischief. On 
October 29, 2002, jury selection for Valdez's trial 
began. The initial jury venire summoned to the 
district court consisted of eleven men and fourteen 
women. The district court removed three men and 
two women for cause on its own motion and without 
objection from Valdez or the State. A third woman 
was excused for cause by Valdez over the State's 
objection. The State then used all four of its 
peremptory challenges to remove women from the 
jury panel; Valdez used all four of his peremptory 
*1221 challenges against men. The jury selected 
to try the case consisted of four men and four 
women. Valdez did not object to the State's use of 
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its peremptory strikes at any point during the jury 
selection process. 
f 4 After the trial jury had been empaneled, the 
remainder of the venire was excused from service. 
The district court judge then swore the jury in, read 
the information to them, and gave them preliminary 
instructions. The court then dismissed the jury for 
lunch, and counsel remained in the courtroom to 
converse with the judge. After discussing potential 
jury instructions with counsel, the judge asked 
whether counsel wanted to address anything else 
before the court recessed. At that point, Valdez's 
counsel raised a Batson challenge, arguing that the 
State's use of its peremptory challenges 
discriminated on the basis of gender. 
If 5 In support of his Batson challenge, Valdez 
argued that a prima facie pattern of discrimination 
could be found in the State's use of its peremptory 
challenges to exclude only female jurors from the 
trial jury. In response, the State argued that 
Valdez's Batson challenge was untimely because the 
jury had already been seated and sworn. The 
district court did not explicitly rule on the 
timeliness of Valdez's Batson challenge, but stated " 
notwithstanding that, can you give me a basis to 
rebut [a] Batson type challenge?" The State then 
provided gender-neutral explanations for each of its 
four peremptory challenges. Valdez offered no 
further argument. The district court ruled that the 
State's peremptory challenges were gender neutral, 
related to the case, specific, and legitimate.FN3 
Accordingly, the district court rejected Valdez's 
Batson challenge. 
challenged the State's use of evidence regarding 
Battered Woman Syndrome in his trial on the 
ground that it was prejudicial. 
f 7 A panel of the Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
the district court. The court of appeals noted that a 
Batson challenge must be timely raised and that 
standards for timeliness are established by local 
procedures. State v. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, \ 
7, 95 P.3d 291. In determining whether Valdez's 
Batson challenge was timely under Utah law, the 
court relied primarily on two of its prior opinions: 
Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 
(Utah Ct.App.1989), and State v. Harrison, 805 
P.2d 769, 775-76 (Utah Ct.App.l991).FN4 Valdez, 
2004 UT App 214, ffif 7-10, 95 P.3d 291. While 
the court of appeals recognized that Carlston had 
favorably cited other jurisdictions' timeliness rules 
that bar Batson challenges after the jury has been 
sworn and the venire dismissed, Valdez, 2004 UT 
App 214, \ 8, 95 P.3d 291 (citing Carlston, 116 
P.2d at 655-56), it chose to decide the present case 
under Harrison, id. 1fl[ 9-10. The court cited 
Harrison for the proposition that the timeliness of a 
Batson challenge is governed by rule 18(c)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. ^ 9 (citing 
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776). The court of appeals 
stated that a district court may consider a Batson 
challenge that is not raised until after the jury is 
sworn and the venire dismissed if it finds "good 
cause" under rule 18(c)(2). Id. 1fl[ 10-11 (citing 
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776). The court also stated 
that if a district court allows counsel to proceed 
with a Batson argument following a timeliness 
objection, it "impliedly finds good cause under rule 
18." Id (citing Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776). 
FN3. The district court's ruling 
corresponds to the requirements set forth 
in Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-99, 106 S.Ct. 
1712, and recognized by this court in State 
v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989). 
K 6 Valdez's trial proceeded, and he was convicted 
of aggravated burglary, possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, and criminal 
mischief. Valdez subsequently appealed the 
district court's denial of his Batson challenge to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. On appeal, Valdez also 
FN4. The court of appeals mistakenly cited 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991), as an opinion of the Utah 
Supreme Court. See State v. Valdez, 2004 
UT App 214, t 9, 95 P.3d 291 ("In State 
v. Harrison, the Utah Supreme Court 
applied rule 18's good cause provision to 
review an untimely Batson challenge."). 
We clarify that Harrison was an opinion of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, not of this 
court. 
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If 8 Based on this legal framework, the court of 
appeals held that the district court had impliedly 
found good cause to allow Valdez's Batson 
challenge to proceed because it *1222 had not 
explicitly ruled on the State's timeliness objection 
and had asked the State to rebut Valdez's argument. 
Id The court also stated that it could not adopt the 
rule proposed by the State-that a Batson challenge 
must be brought before the jury has been sworn and 
the remainder of the venire dismissed-because the 
rule was not " 'firmly established and regularly 
followed.' " Id. fh 8, 11 (quoting Ford v. 
Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 
L.Ed.2d 935 (1991)). According to the court of 
appeals, "in the absence of any firmer and more 
established authority on the subject, we could not 
prevent appellate review of Valdez's constitutional 
claim due to lack of timeliness." FN5 Id. If 11. 
FN5. The court of appeals noted that " 
[tjhis issue would best be addressed by an 
amendment to the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, 
If 11 n. l ,95P.3d291. 
If 9 After ruling on the timeliness issue, the court 
of appeals proceeded to address the merits of 
Valdez's Batson challenge. Id ffif 12-30. 
Applying an abuse of discretion standard of review, 
id f 17, the court held that most of the proffered 
justifications for the State's strikes were not clear 
and specific and lacked a relationship to the case 
being tried, id. fflf 26-28. The court of appeals 
therefore ruled that the district court had abused its 
discretion by rejecting Valdez's Batson challenge 
and reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id 1fl[ 
30-31. Because the court found the denial of 
Valdez's Batson challenge dispositive, it did not 
reach Valdez's arguments regarding the 
admissibility of the Battered Woman Syndrome 
evidence introduced by the State at trial. Id. If 17 
n.2. 
Tf 10 The State petitioned this court for certiorari to 
review the decision of the court of appeals. We 
granted certiorari and have jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2] f 11 On certiorari, "we review the decision 
of the court of appeals, and not that of the district 
court." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, | 25, 63 
P.3d 650 (citation omitted). Whether Valdez's 
Batson challenge was timely raised is a question of 
law. We review questions of law for correctness, 
granting no deference to the legal conclusions of the 
court of appeals. Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt, 
2004UT12,1f9,84P.3dl201. 
ANALYSIS 
\ 12 We granted certiorari on two issues: (1) 
whether a Batson challenge may be deemed timely 
if the jury has been sworn and the remainder of the 
venire excused; and (2) whether the court of 
appeals applied the correct criteria for a Batson 
analysis and the correct standard of review on 
appeal. Because we hold that Valdez's Batson 
challenge was not timely, we do not reach the 
second issue, and therefore express no views on the 
criteria and standard of review applied by the court 
of appeals for Batson challenges.™6 Accordingly, 
our analysis is confined to a discussion of when a 
Batson challenge must be raised in order to be 
considered timely under Utah law. 
FN6. Our decision should not be read 
either as an endorsement or as a rejection 
of the court of appeals' approach regarding 
the second issue. We suggest that parties 
raising Batson challenges continue to 
follow the framework established by the 
United States Supreme Court and our prior 
Batson jurisprudence. See, e.g., Johnson 
v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 125 S.Ct. 
2410, 2416-19, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) 
(addressing the criteria for a Batson 
analysis); State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 1f 
If 14-23, 994 P.2d 177 (same); State v. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 546-49 
(Utah 1996) (same). 
A BATSON CHALLENGE MUST BE RAISED 
BEFORE THE JURY IS SWORN AND BEFORE 
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THE REMAINDER OF THE VENIRE IS 
DISMISSED IN ORDER TO BE TIMELY 
UNDER UTAH LAW 
1f 13 Before addressing Utah law regarding the 
timeliness of Batson challenges, we discuss the 
history of Batson challenges in order to provide 
context for our holding. The United States 
Supreme Court has long held that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits purposeful racial discrimination in the 
selection of jurors. See *1223Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880); 
Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 319, 26 S.Ct. 338, 
50 L.Ed. 497 (1906). The Court first applied this 
principle in the context of peremptory challenges in 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct 824, 13 
L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). In Swain, the Court held that 
it was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for 
a prosecutor to purposefully use peremptory 
challenges to exclude African American jurors from 
the petit jury when the defendant is also African 
American. Id at 222-24, 85 S.Ct. 824. However, 
the case set an exceedingly high evidentiary burden 
for defendants. The Swain Court noted that a black 
defendant could only establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination by demonstrating that the 
prosecutor had continuously and systematically 
used peremptory challenges to strike African 
Americans from the jury venire "in case after case, 
whatever the circumstances." FN7 Id. at 223, 85 
S.Ct. 824. Following Swain, most lower courts 
applying its reasoning required African American 
defendants who challenged a prosecutor's use of 
peremptory strikes on equal protection grounds to 
demonstrate that the prosecutor had exercised 
peremptory strikes in a discriminatory fashion over 
a number of cases. See Batson v. Kentucky, 416 
U.S. 79, 92-93 & n. 16, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 
69 (1986). 
FN7. It should be noted that the evidence 
offered by the defendant in Swain-that the 
prosecutors in his case had used their 
peremptory challenges to exclude African 
Americans from the petit jury-was deemed 
insufficient to establish a prima facie case 
of systematic purposeful discrimination. 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 224-28, 
85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). 
Tf 14 In Batson, the Court rejected Swain's " 
crippling burden of proof," noting that under Swain" 
prosecutors' peremptory challenges [had become] 
largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 
92-93,106 S.Ct. 1712; see also Christopher J. 
Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A Promise Unfulfilled, 
58 UMKC L.Rev. 361, 365 (1990) (noting that in 
the twenty-one years between Swain and Batson, 
only two defendants were able to establish a case of 
purposeful discrimination under Swain ). The 
Batson Court thus replaced the Swain test with an 
evidentiary framework similar to that of Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which allows the 
opponent of a peremptory challenge to establish a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause based " 
solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's 
exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's 
trial." Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712; see 
also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 125 S.Ct. 
2410, 2418 n. 7, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) 
(discussing similarity of Batson framework to "the 
burden-shifting framework in cases arising under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"). 
[3][4][5j[6][7] U 15 The Batson Court established 
a three-step analytical framework to be applied by a 
court considering whether a litigant's use of 
peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.™8 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-97, 106 S.Ct. 
1712. First, the opponent of the peremptory 
challenges must establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination in the selection of the 
petit jury. Id; see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 
765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) 
(discussing the three-part Batson test); State v. 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ffif 17-18, 994 P.2d 177 
(same). In other words, the challenging party must 
"produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial 
judge to draw an inference that discrimination has 
occurred." ™9 *1224 Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417; 
see also Batson, 416 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 
(noting that the challenging party must demonstrate 
that the facts and circumstances raise an inference 
that a juror was excluded from the petit jury on 
account of race); Colwell, 2000 UT 8, If 18, 994 
P.2d 177 ("The challenging party must first make 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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out the prima facie case by presenting facts 
adequate to raise an inference of improper 
discrimination."). Second, once the opponent has 
established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to 
the proponent of the peremptory challenges to rebut 
the prima facie case by offering neutral, 
nondiscriminatory justifications for the peremptory 
challenges. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 
1712; Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2416; Colwell, 2000 
UT 8, \ 19, 994 P.2d 177. A proponent cannot 
meet this burden by simply denying a 
discriminatory motive or professing good faith. 
Batson, 416 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Rather, a 
proponent must proffer justifications that are: (1) 
neutral; (2) related to the particular case to be tried; 
(3) reasonably specific and clear; and (4) 
legitimate. See id at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (" 
[T]he prosecutor must give a 'clear and reasonably 
specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for 
exercising the challenges."(quoting Texas Dep't of 
Cmty. Affairs v. Bur dine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 
S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981))); State v. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) 
(listing the four factors discussed above) (citations 
omitted). Finally, if the proponent provides a 
sufficient explanation for the peremptory 
challenges, the trial court must determine whether 
the opponent of the peremptory challenges has 
proven purposeful discrimination.FN10 Purkett, 
514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769; Johnson, 125 
S.Ct. at 2416; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. 
FN8. The Batson Court discussed this 
three-part test in the context of an African 
American defendant objecting to a 
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges 
to exclude African American jurors from 
the petit jury. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 
106 S.Ct. 1712. However, the Court's 
subsequent cases have expanded the 
applicability of the Batson test to the point 
that it now generally applies to all 
objections to an opponent's use of 
peremptory challenges that are based on 
the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., 
Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2416 (noting that the 
Batson steps "together guide trial courts' 
constitutional review of peremptory strikes 
"). Accordingly, the Batson test will be 
set forth here in general terms, based on its 
present applicability. 
FN9. The Supreme Court has consistently 
declined to specify what type of evidence 
the challenging party must offer to 
establish a prima facie case, and instead 
has relied on trial judges to determine 
whether "all relevant circumstances .... 
give rise to an inference of discrimination." 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 
1712; see also Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2416 
("[A] prima facie case of discrimination 
can be made out by offering a wide variety 
of evidence, so long as the sum of the 
proffered facts gives 'rise to an inference 
of discriminatory purpose.'" (quoting 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712)). 
FN 10. This is because the ultimate burden 
of persuasion in a Batson challenge rests 
with the opponent of the peremptory 
challenges. Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417-18 
"The first two Batson steps govern the 
production of evidence that allows the trial 
court to determine the persuasiveness of 
the defendant's constitutional claim." Id 
at 2418. In the third step, the court 
weighs the evidence obtained in the first 
two steps and determines whether the 
opponent of the peremptory challenges has 
carried his burden to prove purposeful 
discrimination. Id. 
^ 16 Since deciding Batson, the Supreme Court 
has continually increased the scope of the Batson 
test. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409-10, 
111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (holding 
that Batson applies to a prosecutor's use of 
peremptory challenges regardless of whether the 
stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant); 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 
630, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) 
(extending the Batson rule to the use of peremptory 
challenges by private litigants in civil cases); 
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 
2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) (applying Batson to 
criminal defendants' use of peremptory challenges); 
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1KB. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146, 114 S.Ct. 
1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause also prohibits 
discrimination in jury selection on the basis of 
gender). 
If 17 Throughout its Batson jurisprudence, the 
Court has stated that the equal protection right the 
Batson test is designed to protect is premised on 
several important constitutional interests. First, the 
litigants are constitutionally entitled to have their 
case tried by a jury that is selected by fair and 
nondiscriminatory methods.™11 See Strauder, 
100 U.S. at 307-08; Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86, 106 
S.Ct. 1712; see also 1KB., 511 U.S. at 128, 114 
S.Ct. 1419 (stating that litigants in criminal and 
civil trials "have an equal protection right to jury 
selection procedures that are free from 
state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and 
reflective of, historical prejudice"). Second, the " 
individual jurors themselves have a right to 
nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures." 
1KB., 511 U.S. at 140-41, 114 S.Ct. 1419; see 
also *1225McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48, 112 S.Ct. 
2348 ("[Djenying a person participation in jury 
service on account of his race unconstitutionally 
discriminates against the excluded juror."). This 
right is premised on the importance of the jury 
system in American democracy.™12 See, e.g., 
Powers, 499 U.S. at 407, 111 S.Ct. 1364 ("[F]or 
most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is 
their most significant opportunity to participate in 
the democratic process."); 1E.B., 511 U.S. at 
141-42, 114 S.Ct. 1419 ("All persons, when granted 
the opportunity to serve on a jury, have the right not 
to be excluded summarily because of discriminatory 
and stereotypical presumptions...."). Finally, the 
entire community has an interest in fair jury 
selection procedures. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87, 
106 S.Ct. 1712. When jurors are excluded 
pursuant to discriminatory selection criteria, "public 
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice" 
is undermined. Id. Accordingly, courts must ensure 
that jury selection procedures are fair and 
nondiscriminatory, for if a court allows a juror to be 
wrongfully excluded it becomes a "willing 
participant in a scheme that could only undermine 
the very foundation of our system of justice." 
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49, 112 S.Ct. 2348 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
FN11. Unconstitutional discrimination in 
jury selection denies the litigant "the 
protection that a trial by jury is intended to 
secure [:]" trial by a jury of peers. Batson, 
416 U.S. at 86, 106 S.Ct 1712; see also 
1KB., 511 U.S. at 140, 114 S.Ct. 1419 (" 
The litigants are harmed by the risk that 
the prejudice that motivated the 
discriminatory selection of the jury will 
infect the entire proceedings."). 
FN 12. Because of the importance of this 
right and the difficulties that wrongfully 
excluded jurors face in remedying a 
violation of this right themselves, the 
Supreme Court has granted litigants 
third-party standing to assert the rights of 
wrongfully struck jurors on their behalf. 
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413-15, 
111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 
U.S. 614, 629, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 
L.Ed.2d 660 (1991); Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55-56, 112 S.Ct. 
2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992). 
If 18 While the Supreme Court has been very 
explicit regarding the applicability of and basis for 
the Batson test, it has consistently declined to 
formulate procedural rules-such as timeliness 
standards-governing Batson challenges. In Batson, 
the defendant had challenged the prosecutor's use of 
peremptory strikes by moving to discharge the jury 
before it was sworn. 476 U.S. at 83, 106 S.Ct. 1712 
. Though the Court noted that this was "a timely 
objection," id. at 100, 106 S.Ct. 1712, it specifically 
declined to establish "particular procedures" to be 
followed by courts applying Batson, id. at 99, 106 
S.Ct. 1712. Instead, the Court stated that it was up 
to state courts, with their "variety of jury selection 
practices," to establish procedural guidelines. Id. at 
99 &n. 24, 106 S.Ct. 1712. 
^ 19 The Court expanded on this reasoning in 
Fordv. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 
L.Ed.2d 935 (1991). Under Fortf "local rules 
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[provide] the law governing the timeliness of a [ 
Batson] claim." Id. at 423,111 S.Ct. 850. Thus, 
the Court stated that "a state court may adopt a 
general rule that a Batson claim is untimely if it is 
raised for the first time on appeal, or after the jury is 
sworn, or before its members are selected." Id. 
While the Court did not set forth any specific 
guidelines regarding timeliness, it noted that "[t]he 
requirement that any Batson claim be raised not 
only before trial, but in the period between the 
selection of jurors and the administration of their 
oaths, is a sensible rule." Id. at 422-23,111 S.Ct. 
850. However, the Court also held that "only a 
firmly established and regularly followed state 
practice may be interposed by a State to prevent 
subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional 
claim." Id. at 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Accordingly, under Batson and Ford, state 
procedural rules govern the timeliness of a Batson 
objection, but those rules must be firmly established 
and regularly followed in order to bar appellate 
consideration of the merits of a Batson challenge on 
timeliness grounds. While the Court has not 
expanded on its reasoning from Ford, it recently 
noted that the Batson test is meant to "encourage[ ] 
prompt rulings on objections to peremptory 
challenges without substantial disruption of the jury 
selection process." Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2418 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Tf 20 As the resolution of the case before us turns 
on whether Valdez's Batson challenge-raised after 
the jury had been sworn and the remainder of the 
venire dismissed-was timely, we must determine 
what the established procedures are under Utah law 
regarding the timeliness of Batson challenges. We 
begin our discussion with a review of the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
*1226 f 21 In State v. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, 
95 P.3d 291, the Utah Court of Appeals held that 
Valdez's Batson challenge was timely on two 
separate grounds. First, the court of appeals held, 
based on its prior decision in State v. Harrison, 805 
P.2d 769, 776 (Utah Ct.App.1991), that Valdez's 
Batson challenge was timely under rule 18(c)(2) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Valdez, 
2004 UT App 214, ffi[ 9-10, 95 P.3d 291. 
Second, the court of appeals held that it could not 
deem Valdez's Batson challenge untimely because 
the rule proposed by the State-that a Batson 
challenge must be raised before the jury is sworn 
and the venire dismissed-"has not heretofore been a 
firmly established and regularly followed state 
[procedure]." Id \ 11,95 P.3d 291 (citing Ford, 
498 U.S. at 424, 111 S.Ct. 850) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). For 
the reasons discussed below, the court of appeals 
was incorrect as a matter of law with regard to both 
of its determinations. 
A. A Batson Challenge Must be Raised Before the 
Jury is Sworn to be Timely Under Utah Law 
f 22 In ruling that Valdez's Batson challenge was 
timely under rule 18(c)(2), the court of appeals 
relied heavily on its decision in Harrison. See 
State v. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ffi[ 9-10, 95 
P.3d 291 (citing State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 
775-76 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). In Harrison, the 
Utah Court of Appeals considered the timeliness of 
a Batson challenge raised immediately after the jury 
was sworn but before the venire was dismissed. 
805 P.2d at 776. Although the parties did not brief 
or argue the applicability of rule 18, the court 
determined sua sponte that rule 18(c)(2) governs the 
timeliness of a Batson objection in Utah.™13^. 
The relevant language of that rule, which has not 
changed since Harrison was decided, provides as 
follows: 
FN13. This determination runs counter to 
the court of appeals' decision three years 
earlier in Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 
116 P.2d 653 (Utah Ct.App.1989). In 
Carlston, the defendant had waited to raise 
her Batson challenge until after the trial 
had concluded. Id. at 654. The court of 
appeals held that a Batson challenge must 
be timely raised or it is waived. Id. at 
655-56. It then proceeded to discuss 
timeliness standards for Batson challenges 
at length. Id. In its discussion, the court of 
appeals cited our pre-Batson decision in 
State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216 (Utah 
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1986), for the proposition that a challenge 
to the jury panel must be raised before the 
jury is sworn in. Carlston, 116 P.2d at 
655-56 n. 5 (citing Bankhead, 727 P.2d at 
217). 
A challenge to an individual juror may be either 
peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an 
individual juror may be made only before the jury is 
sworn to try the action, except the court may, for 
good cause, permit it to be made after the juror is 
sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. 
Utah R.Crim. P. 18(c)(2). Thus, in Harrison, the 
court of appeals held that a Batson challenge is 
timely under rule 18(c)(2) even when it is raised 
after the jury is sworn if the trial court finds good 
cause to permit it. 805 P.2d at 776. The court of 
appeals also held that a trial court implicitly finds 
good cause under rule 18(c)(2)"by allowing counsel 
to proceed with their [Batson] arguments." Id. 
% 23 In Valdez, the Utah Court of Appeals 
dramatically expanded the scope of Harrison by 
ruling that "a district court may consider a 
defendant's Batson challenge beyond the dismissal 
of the venire." ¥NU *\221 Valdez, 2004 UT App 
214, f 10, 95 P.3d 291 (emphasis added). 
Relying on Harrison, the court of appeals stated, " 
So long as it 'allows counsel to proceed with their [ 
Batson] arguments,' the district court impliedly 
finds good cause under rule 18 to consider the 
constitutional claim." Id. (quoting Harrison, 805 
P.2d at 776) (alterations in original). Because the 
district court requested that the State respond to 
Valdez's Batson challenge despite the State's 
timeliness objection, the court of appeals held that 
the district court had impliedly found good cause to 
allow the Batson challenge under rule 18(c)(2). Id. 
FN14. In doing so, the court of appeals in 
Valdez implicitly overruled the standards 
for timely Batson challenges it had 
adopted in Carlston. While the court of 
appeals in Carlston noted that a Batson 
challenge must be raised before the jury is 
sworn, see Carlston, 116 P.2d at 655-56 n. 
5 (citing Bankhead, 727 P.2d at 217), it 
went on to consider other timeliness 
concerns. The court stated that "the 
Batson court envisioned a prompt motion 
to strike the jury panel, 'probably before 
the venire was dismissed.'" Id. at 656 
(quoting United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 
656, 667 (5th Cir.1986)). In support of 
this rule, the court of appeals favorably 
cited opinions from several other 
jurisdictions and then stated that the rule 
was based on "two justifications:" (1) " 
preventing] defendants from 'sandbagging 
' the prosecution by waiting until trial has 
concluded unsatisfactorily before insisting 
on an explanation for jury strikes[;]" and 
(2) remedying "prosecutorial misconduct ... 
prior to commencement of trial simply by 
seating the wrongfully struck venireperson. 
" Id. (quoting United States v. Forbes, 
816 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir.1987)). 
While the Valdez Court characterized the 
rules laid out in Carlston as dicta, 2004 
UT App 214, U 8, 95 P.3d 291 a close 
reading of Carlston demonstrates that the 
court of appeals meant to adopt these rules. 
See Carlston, 116 P.2d at 656 ("We 
believe they apply with equal force in the 
civil litigation context."(emphasis added)). 
[8] K 24 The court of appeals erred as a matter of 
law in holding that Valdez's Batson challenge was 
timely under rule 18(c)(2) because rule 18(c)(2) is 
inapplicable on its face to Batson challenges. By 
its terms, rule 18(c)(2) provides procedural 
guidelines for a litigant's peremptory or for cause " 
challenge to an individual juror." Utah R.Crim. P. 
18(c)(2) (emphasis added). In other words, rule 
18(c)(2) provides a time-frame in which a litigant 
may choose to exercise a peremptory or for cause 
challenge to remove an individual juror from the 
venire. Id. Under rule 18(c)(2), a litigant who 
wishes to remove a juror with either a peremptory 
or for cause challenge may only do so before the 
jury is sworn unless the trial court finds good cause 
to allow a challenge afterward. Id. In any event, a 
litigant may not remove a juror with a peremptory 
or for cause challenge once evidence has been 
presented. Id. 
[9] [^ 25 The procedural framework contained in 
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rule 18(c)(2) does not govern Batson challenges. 
A peremptory challenge is a common law 
procedural device designed to assist litigants in 
selecting an impartial jury. See Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620, 111 
S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991). In contrast, a 
Batson challenge is not itself a peremptory 
challenge, but rather an objection to an opposing 
litigant's improper use of peremptory challenges. 
See Batson v. Kentucky, 416 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S.Ct. 
1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (noting that the Batson 
test is designed to prevent the use of peremptory 
challenges to purposefully discriminate "in the 
empaneling of the petit jury"). A litigant who 
raises a Batson challenge is objecting that the "jury 
was improperly constituted due to an equal 
protection violation." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400, 414, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); 
see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ( 
"[T]he defendant [has] the right to be tried by a jury 
whose members are selected pursuant to 
non-discriminatory criteria."). In other words, a 
Batson challenge amounts to a statement that the 
opposing litigant's use of peremptory challenges 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and as a result 
the empaneled jury is improperly composed. See, 
e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 412-13, 111 S.Ct. 1364 
(noting that a Batson challenge is a challenge to the 
"composition of the trier of fact"); Ford v. Georgia, 
498 U.S. 411, 420 n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 
935 (1991) (noting that a Batson challenge is an 
objection to "the selection of an objecting 
defendant's own jury").Rule 18(c)(2) has no 
applicability to an objection made to the 
composition of the empaneled jury, and thus does 
not govern Batson challenges. Therefore, the Utah 
Court of Appeals erred in relying on it as the 
standard for determining whether a Batson 
objection is timely under Utah law.FN15 
FN15. Thus, a trial court cannot impliedly 
find good faith to allow a Batson challenge 
after the jury has been sworn under rule 
18(c)(2) because rule 18(c)(2) does not 
apply to Batson challenges. We note that 
an equally plausible explanation for the 
trial court's request that the State explain 
its use of peremptory challenges 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
notwithstanding the timeliness of Valdez's 
Batson challenge is that the trial court 
simply wanted to ensure that an adequate 
contemporaneous record was made. 
[10] 1f 26 The court of appeals also erred as a 
matter of law in its determination that a rule that " 
would prohibit Batson challenges after the venire 
has been dismissed and the jury has been sworn, [is] 
not ... a 'firmly established and regularly followed 
state [procedure].' " Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, If 
11, 95 P.3d 291 (quoting Ford, 498 U.S. at 423, 
111 S.Ct. 850) (alteration in original). According 
to the court of appeals, "At best, this rule could be 
gleaned by analogy and implication* 1228 from 
Harrison and rule 18[ (c)(2)]."MAs discussed 
above, rule 18(c)(2) is inapplicable in any event. 
Furthermore, a survey of Utah law indicates that it 
is a well established principle that Batson 
challenges must be raised both before the jury is 
sworn and before the remainder of the venire is 
dismissed in order to be deemed timely. 
1[ 27 In State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216 (Utah 
1986), a case decided by this court prior to Batson, 
we considered the timeliness of a challenge to the 
composition of the jury. The defendant, who was 
African American, argued that her constitutional 
rights had been violated because the jury selected to 
try her case did not include any members of her 
race. Id. at 217. She moved to quash the jury 
panel, but not until all of the evidence had already 
been admitted. Id. Citing section 78-46-16(1) of 
the Utah Code, we held that the defendant's 
objection was waived because "any challenge to the 
jury must be lodged before the jury is sworn." 
Bankhead, 727 P.2d at 217 (emphasis added). We 
also cited the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 
S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), noting that under 
Taylor a litigant does not have a Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury that is a perfect cross section of the 
community but is entitled to a jury selected from a 
venire that represents a cross section of the 
community. Bankhead, 727 P.2d at 217 (citing 
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. 692). 
f 2STaylor is generally representative of the 
Supreme Court's pre-Batson jurisprudence 
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regarding the composition of juries, which was " 
concerned largely with discrimination during 
selection of the venire." Batson, 476 U.S. at 88, 
106 S.Ct. 1712. This trend began with Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880) 
where the Court held that it is a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause to exclude members of the 
defendant's race from the jury venire solely on 
account of race. Id. at 307-09. Over time, Strauder 
came to stand for the principle that under the Equal 
Protection Clause the jury venire must be selected 
pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria, see Martin v. 
Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 319-21, 26 S.Ct. 338, 50 
L.Ed. 497 (1906), and must be representatively 
drawn from the community, Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145, 156, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 
(1968). However, the Court consistently held that 
the Equal Protection Clause does not guarantee a 
litigant a jury of a certain composition. See Akins v. 
Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403, 65 S.Ct. 1276, 89 L.Ed. 
1692 (1945). In Taylor, the Court applied these 
same rules under the Sixth Amendment, holding 
that although the Sixth Amendment does not 
guarantee that a petit jury will "mirror the 
community," it does guarantee that the petit jury 
will be selected from a venire that is representative 
of the community. 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. 692. 
| 29 In Batson, the Court extended the principles 
established in its previous cases regarding the 
composition of the venire to the composition of the 
petit jury.™16 476 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 1712. 
The Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment 
principles that prevented purposeful discrimination 
in the selection of the jury venire were 
indistinguishable from the principles animating 
concern over purposeful discrimination in the 
selection of the petit jury. See id. ("[T]he State 
may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to neutral 
procedures but then resort to discrimination at 
other stages in the selection process.'" (citations 
omitted)). Thus, the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence regarding the selection of the venire 
and its jurisprudence regarding the selection of the 
petit jury are complementary. 
FN16. In fact, the Court relied on its cases 
dealing with the composition of the jury 
venire to overrule Swain, noting that " 
since the decision in Swain, this Court has 
recognized that a defendant may make a 
prima facie showing of purposeful racial 
discrimination in selection of the venire by 
relying solely on the facts concerning its 
selection in his case." Batson, 476 U.S. at 
95, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Moreover, the 
three-step burden-shifting evidentiary 
framework established in Batson is the 
exact same evidentiary inquiry the Court 
had devised in its pre-Batson cases dealing 
with the composition of the venire. Id. at 
93-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. 
^ 30 The relationship in Utah law between 
challenges to the venire and challenges to the petit 
jury is also complementary, particularly with regard 
to procedural rules. Beginning with Bankhead, this 
court has consistently held that challenges to the 
jury, both to the *1229 composition of the venire 
and the composition of the petit jury, must be raised 
before the jury is sworn or they are untimely. In 
Bankhead, we relied on the procedural guidelines 
contained in the Jury and Witness Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-46-1 to -41 (1953), in holding that the 
defendant's objection to the composition of her petit 
jury was untimely. Bankhead, 727 P.2d at 217. 
Two portions of that Act are relevant to our 
discussion. First, section 78-46-3 states, "A citizen 
shall not be excluded or exempt from jury service 
on account of race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin, age, occupation, disability, or economic 
status." Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3 (2002). 
Second, section 78-46-16 provides that a party 
seeking relief based on a "failure to comply with 
this act in selecting a ... trial jury" must move for 
relief "before the trial jury is sworn." Id.§ 
78-46-16(1) (2002) (emphasis added). That 
section also states that this procedure is "the 
exclusive means by which a [litigant] ... may 
challenge a jury on the ground that the jury was not 
selected in conformity with this act." Id.§ 
78-46-16(3) (emphasis added). 
K 31 We note that the Jury and Witness Act 
purports to impose procedural rules on Utah's courts 
and therefore may be in tension with article VIII, 
section 4 of the Utah Constitution. As we recently 
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noted in Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, 133 P.3d 
370, this provision of the Utah Constitution vests 
the Utah Supreme Court with the authority to adopt 
rules of procedure to be used in Utah's courts, id K 
15 n. 3, 133 P.3d 370 (quoting Utah Const art. 
VIII, § 4), and the legislature with power to alter the 
procedural rules adopted by this court "upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature,"Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4. However, 
the status of the procedural rules contained within 
the Jury and Witness Act is not before us. In 
addition, this court has previously stated on one 
occasion that the Act does not govern constitutional 
challenges to the jury selection process.FN17 State 
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 574 n. 115 (1987). 
Accordingly, the procedural rules contained within 
the Act could not conflict with any procedural rules 
relevant to our determination of this case, nor do 
they. A careful review of our case law 
demonstrates that the timeliness standards applied 
by this court to constitutional challenges to the jury 
selection process, including Batson challenges, 
continued to mirror those contained in section 
78-46-16 following our decision in Tillman.mn 
FN17. In Harrison, the Utah Court of 
Appeals made much of this court's decision 
in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (1987). 
Relying on Tillman, the court of appeals in 
Harrison rejected the argument that the 
defendant's Batson challenge-not raised 
until after the jury was sworn-was untimely 
under the prior version of the Jury and 
Witness ActHarrison, 805 P.2d at 776 
(citing the Jury Selection and Service Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16(1) 
(Supp.1990)). The court of appeals noted 
that the defendant's Batson challenge was a 
constitutional objection, not an objection 
made under the Act. Id. The court thus 
concluded that the timeliness standards 
contained within section 78-46-16(1) did 
not apply to the defendant's Batson 
challenge, and proceeded to apply the 
timeliness standards contained within rule 
18(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Id (citing Tillman, 750 P.2d at 
574 n. 115). However, even following 
Tillman, this court has consistently applied 
timeliness standards to constitutional 
challenges to the jury selection process 
that mirror those contained within section 
78-46-16. See infra ffif 32-35. 
FN18. Indeed, it would make for strange 
procedure to apply different timeliness 
standards for challenges raised pursuant to 
the Jury and Witness Act-which protects a 
broader range of classifications from 
discrimination in the jury selection 
process, seeUtah Code Ann. § 78-46-3 
,-from those applied to constitutional 
challenges. As with a Batson challenge, a 
violation of the Jury and Witness Act can 
only be fully remedied by an objection 
brought both before the jury is sworn and 
before the venire is dismissed. See infra 
111142-45. 
H 32 In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988), 
the first case decided by this court under the Batson 
framework, the timeliness of the defendant's Batson 
challenge was not at issue because the defendant 
had moved to quash the entire jury panel on fair 
cross-section grounds before the prosecution's 
peremptory challenges were even exercised, and he 
apparently renewed the objection immediately after 
the prosecution exercised a peremptory strike to 
remove a minority jury member. Id. at 592-93, 596. 
*1230 % 33 However, in Redd v. Negley, 785 P.2d 
1098 (Utah 1989), the timeliness of a challenge to 
the composition of the jury was squarely before the 
court. There, the plaintiff apparently raised the 
issue of the composition of the selected jury off the 
record before the jury was sworn. Id. at 1099. 
After the jury was sworn and dismissed for lunch, 
the plaintiff made a vague objection on the record 
regarding the number of minority jurors on the petit 
jury. Id at 1099-1100. The trial court denied the 
plaintiffs objection under section 78-46-16, ruling 
that the objection had not been raised before the 
jury was sworn. Id at 1100. On appeal, this court 
disagreed as to the proper way to view the plaintiffs 
vague objection. The majority believed the 
plaintiffs objection amounted only to an objection 
that there was not a proportionate number of 
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minority jurors on the petit jury. Id. at 1100-01. 
In contrast, the dissent stated that the plaintiffs 
objection could also be characterized as an 
objection to the composition of the jury venire or to 
the defense's use of peremptory challenges to 
remove the only two minority members from the 
selected panel-in other words, a Batson challenge. 
Id. at 1103-04 (Durham, J., dissenting). However, 
the court drew no distinction between these 
characterizations in its treatment of the plaintiffs 
objection. Rather, the court noted that the record 
indicated "that plaintiff objected to the jury 
selection prior to the swearing of the jury and that 
the jury was passed for cause only with the 
reservation that plaintiffs challenge could be later 
made." mi9 Id. at 1100. The court held that 
because the challenge was raised before the jury 
was sworn in, the trial court had erred in denying 
the challenge on timeliness grounds, citing both 
section 78-46-16 and Bankhead. Id. 
FN 19. We note that this procedure, 
whereby an objection was made prior to 
the swearing of the jury but not addressed 
by the court until after the jury was sworn 
in and dismissed, will generally not meet 
the standard we set forth today. A Batson 
challenge must be raised both before the 
jury is sworn and before the venire is 
dismissed in order to allow the trial court 
to adequately remedy a Batson violation if 
one has occurred. See infra ffl[ 42-45. 
Obviously, if the grounds for the Batson 
challenge are not articulated until after the 
jury has been sworn and the remainder of 
the venire is dismissed, the trial court 
cannot cure a Batson violation. Id. 
1f 34 In State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991), 
this court again addressed the timeliness of a Batson 
challenge. There, the defendant alleged that the 
prosecutor had used a racially motivated 
peremptory challenge to remove the only minority 
juror from the jury venire. Id. at 336. The 
defendant raised his Batson challenge by moving to 
quash the jury panel before the jury was sworn. Id. 
The trial court allowed the prosecutor to explain the 
reasons for the peremptory challenge, then denied 
the motion on timeliness grounds. Id. at 336-37. 
On appeal, the State conceded that the trial court 
had erred in denying the Batson challenge on 
timeliness grounds. Id. at 337. This court agreed, 
noting that the defendant's Batson challenge had 
been raised immediately after the peremptory 
challenges were completed and before the jury was 
sworn. Id. The court also cited section 78-46-16 
and Bankhead in support of the position that the 
motion had been timely made. Id. 
TI 35 In all of this court's decisions since Span, we 
have never deviated from the rule that a challenge 
to the composition of the jury must be raised before 
the jury is sworn in. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 
327, 338 (1993) (defendant objected to composition 
of the jury on fair cross section grounds before the 
jury was sworn in); State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 
456 (Utah 1994) (defendant raised Batson challenge 
"[p]rior to the swearing of the jury"); State v. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 546 (Utah 1996)( 
Batson challenge raised as soon as prosecutor used 
peremptory challenge to remove only minority juror 
from panel of prospective jurors); State v. Colwell, 
2000 UT 8, K 14, 994 P.2d \ll(Batson challenge 
raised as soon as prosecutor used peremptory 
challenge to remove only African American juror 
from panel of prospective jurors). Even the Utah 
Court of Appeals' decision in Salt Lake County v. 
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah Ct.App.1989), which 
properly cited Bankhead, followed this rule, see id. 
at 656 n. 5. The sole aberration prior to the court of 
appeals' decision in this case is Harrison, in which 
the court of appeals erroneously applied rule 
18(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
Batson*l23l challenges. Harrison, 805 P.2d at 
775-76. However, our decision in Span, which 
followed Harrison, clearly indicates that this court 
continued to rely on the standard established in 
Bankhead. Span, 819 P.2d at 337. It has therefore 
long been the law in Utah that constitutional 
challenges to the composition of the jury-both the 
venire and to the selected jury-must be raised before 
the jury is sworn. 
1f 36 Our decision is bolstered by the fact that the 
only rule of criminal procedure that applies to the 
composition of juries requires that a challenge be 
brought before the jury is sworn. In contrast with 
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rule 18(c)(2), which does not apply to challenges to 
the jury as a panel, rule 18(c)(1) governs challenges 
to "[t]he panel ... of jurors called to serve at a 
particular court or for the trial of a particular action. 
" Utah R.Crim. P. 18(c)(1). Under this rule, a 
party may challenge the panel based "on a material 
departure from the procedure prescribed with 
respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and 
return of the panel." Utah. R.Crim. P. 18(c)(1)(f). 
In other words, this rule governs challenges to the 
composition of the entire venire. Under this rule, 
all challenges to the jury panel must "be taken 
before the jury is sworn." Utah R.Crim. P. 
18(c)(l)(ii) (emphasis added). As discussed above, 
supra ffif 2$~29,Batson challenges are based on 
Fourteenth Amendment concerns identical to those 
implicated by discrimination in the selection of the 
entire venire. Batson, 476 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 
1712. Moreover, Utah procedural law does not 
distinguish between challenges to the venire and 
challenges to the petit jury. Therefore, while rule 
18(c)(1) does not explicitly apply to Batson 
challenges, which are challenges to the composition 
of the selected jury, it contains the same timeliness 
rule that applies to Batson challenges. We also 
note that the annotations for rule 18 cross-reference 
the Jury and Witness Act, which we have relied on 
for our Batson timeliness standards. Utah R.Crim. 
P. 18 cross references. 
[^ 37 We agree with the court of appeals that Utah's 
procedural standards with respect to Batson 
challenges "would best be addressed by an 
amendment to the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, \ 11 n. 1, 
95 P.3d 291. The Rules of Criminal Procedure 
should clearly reflect our case law with respect to 
this important procedural requirement, and we will 
request the assistance of our Advisory Committee in 
drafting such a rule. It is nonetheless clear under 
Utah law that a constitutional challenge to the jury 
selection process-whether it be to the entire venire 
or to the jury selected to try the case-must be 
brought before the jury is sworn. This rule has 
long been a "firmly established and regularly 
followed state practice" in Utah, as required by Ford 
. 498 U.S. at 423, 111 S.Ct. 850 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we 
hold that Valdez's Batson challenge, which was not 
brought until after the jury was sworn, was untimely. 
T[ 38 While our holding is dispositive of this case, 
it does not end our analysis. We hold that a Batson 
challenge must be raised not only before the jury is 
sworn, but also before the remainder of the venire is 
dismissed in order to be deemed timely under Utah 
law. While we believe that the second part of this 
rule is established state law, even if it is not "firmly 
established and regularly followed," id, we hold 
that it is a procedural requisite to a Batson 
challenge from this point forward.™20 We first 
address the origins of this rule in Utah law, and then 
the justifications for it. 
FN20. Even if the rule that a Batson 
challenge must be brought before the 
remainder of the venire is dismissed is not " 
a firmly established and regularly followed 
state practice," we note that we are not " 
interpos [ing] ... [it] to prevent subsequent 
review" in this case. Ford v. Georgia, 
498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 
L.Ed.2d 935 (1991) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). The rule that a 
Batson challenge must be brought before 
the jury is sworn is firmly established in 
Utah, and thus it is that rule which bars 
subsequent review in this case. 
B. A Batson Challenge Must be Raised Before the 
Venire is Dismissed to be Timely Under Utah Law 
f 39 While this court has not explicitly considered 
the implications of a Batson challenge raised after 
the remainder of the venire has been dismissed, the 
Utah Court of *1232 Appeals has. In Salt Lake 
County v. Carlston, the court of appeals stated that 
a Batson challenge, like other objections, must be " 
timely presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." 776 P.2d 653, 
655 (Utah Ct.App.1989). In addressing timeliness 
standards, the court of appeals stated that a Batson 
challenge must be raised before the jury is sworn 
but also seemed to adopt a rule that a Batson 
challenge must be raised before the venire is 
dismissed. Id. at 655-56. The court stated that " 
the Batson court envisioned a prompt motion to 
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strike the jury panel, 'probably before the venire 
was dismissed.'" Id. at 656 (quoting United States 
v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir.1986)). The 
court of appeals noted that this rule was based on " 
two justifications:" (1) "preventing] defendants 
from 'sandbagging' the prosecution by waiting 
until trial has concluded unsatisfactorily before 
insisting on an explanation for jury strikes[;]" and 
(2) remedying "prosecutorial misconduct prior to 
commencement of trial simply by seating the 
wrongfully struck venireperson." Id. (quoting 
United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th 
Cir.1987)). 
| 40 In State v. Harrison, the court of appeals 
considered a Batson challenge raised after the jury 
was sworn but before the venire was dismissed. 
805 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah Ct.App.1991). The court 
cited Carlston to support its position that the 
defendant had raised his Batson challenge in a 
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling from the trial 
court. Id. at 776. While the court of appeals 
mistakenly applied the timeliness standards of rule 
18(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
the Batson challenge, it never contradicted its 
position in Carlston that a Batson challenge must be 
raised before the venire is dismissed. See id. 
Obviously, if a Batson violation is to be remedied 
by seating the wrongfully struck juror, as implied by 
Carlston, 116 P.2d at 656, a Batson challenge must 
be raised before the venire is dismissed if the trial 
court is to properly rule on it, id. at 655. Thus, the 
only logical reading of Harrison is that the court of 
appeals left intact the Carlston rule that a Batson 
challenge must be raised before the venire is 
dismissed. 
Tf 41 Until the court of appeals' decision in State v. 
Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, % 10, 95 P.3d 291, no 
Utah court had ever allowed a Batson challenge to 
proceed as timely after the venire had been 
dismissed. We hold that the court of appeals in 
Valdez erred by reading Harrison to mean that a 
Batson challenge can be raised after the dismissal of 
the venire. Rather, the rule established in Carlston 
that a Batson challenge must be raised before the 
venire is dismissed existed undisturbed until the 
court of appeals implicitly overruled it in Valdez. 
Id. Even if this were not the case, we would be 
compelled to adopt and apply this rule 
prospectively, for this rule logically flows from the 
rationale underlying a Batson challenge. 
If 42 In Carlston, the Utah Court of Appeals 
correctly noted that "the process mandated by 
Batson... rests on the premise that the trial court will 
hear the objection and make a factual finding of 
whether the [proponent] has used peremptory 
challenges in a discriminatory manner." Carlston, 
116 P.2d at 656. The court noted that an untimely 
Batson objection impedes the ability of the trial 
judge to make a proper factual finding on the 
evidence presented and also deprives the proponent 
"of the opportunity to present evidence of any 
constitutionally permissible reasons for challenges 
to the venire members." Id. Indeed, the three-step 
process of Batson would be severely impeded were 
a Batson challenge to be allowed after the jury 
selection process is complete. The burden-shifting 
framework of Batson is best implemented if it is 
litigated while the peremptory strikes are fresh in 
the minds of both the court and the litigants. See 
McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (2d 
Cir.1996) (citing numerous decisions holding that 
the "subjective" nature of the peremptory challenge 
"mandates that any objection to its use be raised 
and ruled upon promptly"). 
\ 43 First, the party raising the Batson challenge 
will be better able to make out a prima facie case if 
he can discuss the proponent's use of peremptory 
strikes in relation to the characteristics of the 
individual jurors stricken as well any relevant voir 
dire. In other words, the opponent will be more 
equipped to demonstrate that the Batson*l233 
challenge has merit if he raises it sooner rather than 
later.™21 See State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 455 
(Utah 1994) (noting that the purpose of the prima 
facie requirement is to "separate meritless claims of 
discrimination from those that may have merit" 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Second, the proponent of the peremptory strikes is 
more capable of presenting evidence to rebut a 
Batson challenge if the Batson challenge is 
promptly raised because both voir dire and the 
stricken jurors will be fresh in his mind. Finally, 
the trial judge must be able to weigh the evidence 
presented to determine whether the Batson standard 
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has been met. This necessarily requires that the 
trial judge weigh the arguments and credibility of 
both litigants in light of the individual jurors' 
behavior, mannerisms, and responses to voir dire. 
This duty is likewise accomplished more effectively 
if a Batson challenge is promptly raised. "The 
Batson framework is designed to produce actual 
answers to suspicions and inferences that 
discrimination may have infected the jury selection 
process." Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 125 
S.Ct. 2410, 2418, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005). In 
order to ensure that this framework produces actual 
answers, it is necessary that Batson challenges are 
promptly raised and that courts timely rule upon 
them. Id. The rule we set forth, which requires that 
a Batson challenge be raised both before the jury is 
sworn and before the venire is dismissed, efficiently 
allows the trial court to determine the issues the 
Batson test is designed to resolve. 
FN21. This is not to say that a party who 
raises a Batson challenge before 
peremptory challenges are even used has 
raised a timely Batson challenge. 
Obviously, a party cannot properly raise a 
Batson challenge until that party is able to 
make out a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination, which in most cases will 
not be possible until peremptory 
challenges are exercised. 
f 44 In addition, a Batson challenge must be raised 
in such a manner that the trial court is able to 
fashion a remedy in the event a Batson violation has 
occurred. As the Johnson Court noted, the Batson 
test "encourages prompt rulings on objections to 
peremptory challenges without substantial 
disruption of the jury selection process." Id. 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A 
Batson violation can only be remedied without 
substantially disrupting the jury selection process if 
it is brought before the venire is dismissed. If a 
Batson violation is found before the venire is 
dismissed, the violation can be remedied simply by 
reinstating the stricken juror. Once the venire has 
been dismissed, however, a sustained Batson 
challenge will require the trial judge to, at 
minimum, call additional jurors, and may require 
the judge to call an entirely new venire from which 
to select a new jury. Also, if a Batson violation is 
found after the jury has been sworn and the venire 
excused, the only available remedy is a mistrial. FN22 
See McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1247. We see no 
legitimate reason to sanction such an inefficient use 
of judicial time and resources, or to allow such a 
burden to be imposed on the parties. Moreover, to 
allow a Batson challenge to proceed after the venire 
has been dismissed is only to sanction abuse. If 
such a result were allowed, a party would be able to 
delay raising a Batson challenge until it determined 
whether it approved of the selected jury. *1234 
Such sandbagging is antithetical to notions of 
judicial economy and procedural fairness. 
FN22. In McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 
1243 (2d Cir.1996), the court observed: 
If... a Batson objection may be raised after 
the jury has been sworn and trial has 
begun, there can be no remedy short of 
aborting the trial. This would permit the 
defendant to manipulate the system to the 
extreme prejudice of the prosecution and 
give the defendant a strong inducement to 
delay raising the objection until trial is 
underway. As the trial judge is unlikely 
for reasons of judicial economy to abort 
the trial, the defendant may have the 
opportunity to test his fortunes with the 
first jury, preserving the opportunity for a 
mistrial and a second round in the event of 
a conviction. See United States v. 
Dobynes, 905 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (8th 
Cir. [1990] ) (holding that Batson 
challenge raised for the first time after trial 
was untimely in part because only remedy 
after trial is vacating the conviction), cert. 
denied,498 U.S. 877, 111 S.Ct. 206, 112 
L.Ed.2d 167 (1990); United States v. 
Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th 
Cir.l987)("The 'timely objection' rule is 
designed to prevent defendants from 
sandbagging' the prosecution by waiting 
until trial has concluded unsatisfactorily 
before insisting on an explanation for jury 
strikes that by then the prosecutor may 
largely have forgotten."). 
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1f 45 Finally, the rights that the Batson challenge is 
designed to protect cannot be fully vindicated if a 
Batson challenge is allowed after the dismissal of 
the venire. A Batson challenge is designed to 
remedy "harm to the litigants, the community, and 
the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded" 
that occurs when discriminatory jury selection 
criteria are tolerated. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 
127, 140, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). 
While the Court has held that individual jurors who 
are wrongfully excluded may bring suit, it has also 
noted that "[a]s a practical matter ... these 
challenges are rare." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400, 414, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). 
This is because "[potential jurors are not parties ... 
and have no opportunity to be heard at the time of 
their exclusion." Id. Moreover, a wrongfully 
stricken juror cannot "easily obtain declaratory or 
injunctive relief when discrimination occurs." Id. 
Therefore, in the vast majority of cases in which an 
individual juror is wrongfully excluded, the 
discrimination against the juror goes unredressed if 
he remains excluded from jury service. The only 
logical way to ensure the possibility of redress is to 
require that a Batson objection be raised before the 
venire is dismissed. Under this rule, if a Batson 
challenge is found, the improperly excluded juror 
can then be reinstated. 
If 46 In summary, we hold that a Batson challenge 
must be raised both before the jury is sworn and 
before the venire is dismissed in order to be timely 
under Utah law. We note that this rule is similar to 
the rule that was sanctioned by the Supreme Court 
in Ford v. Georgia. See 498 U.S. 411, 422, 111 
S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991) ("The 
requirement that any Batson claim be raised not 
only before trial, but in the period between the 
selection of the jurors and the administration of 
their oaths, is a sensible rule."). We also note that 
the fact that the rule we adopt is widely followed by 
other jurisdictions-both federal and state-that have 
considered this issue. See, e.g., Morning v. Zapata 
Protein (USA), Inc., 128 F.3d 213, 216 (4th 
Cir.1997) (noting that most of the federal circuits 
have taken the cue from Ford and "required] 
Batson challenges to be raised, at the latest, before 
the venire is excused"); McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1247 ( 
"The Court's discussion in Batson, however, makes 
clear that it envisioned an objection raised during 
the jury selection process."(emphasis added)); 
State v. Ford, 2001 MT 230, \ 30, 306 Mont. 517, 
39 P.3d 108 (holding that a Batson challenge is not 
timely if the jury has been sworn and the venire 
dismissed, and observing that "[s]everal 
jurisdictions have closely analyzed Batson's 
language and concluded that the U.S. Supreme 
Court envisioned that a Batson challenge must be 
made before the jury is sworn," while citing 
numerous state decisions barring Batson objections 
after the jury is sworn and the venire is dismissed). 
We are aware of no case in any jurisdiction, aside 
from the court of appeals' decision in this case 
below, in which a court found a Batson challenge to 
be timely after both the jury was sworn and the 
remainder of the venire was dismissed-in other 
words, after the jury selection process was wholly 
complete.FN23 Accordingly, we hold that Valdez's 
Batson challenge-raised after the jury was sworn 
and the venire dismissed-was untimely under Utah 
law. 
FN23. Valdez cites to only one other case 
in which a court allowed a Batson 
challenge to proceed after the jury had 
been sworn. See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 
25 Va.App. 745, 492 S.E.2d 492, 493 
(1997). While it is true that in Lewis the 
Virginia Court of Appeals interpreted its 
state's statutes to allow a Batson challenge 
to proceed after the jury was sworn "with 
leave of court", the court declined to 
extend its holding to a situation in which 
the jury had been sworn and the remainder 
of the venire excused. Id. at 494. The 
court reasoned that: 
A trial court's exercise of discretion may 
be improperly cabined, however, if the 
challenge is made after the jury is sworn 
and the remaining venirepersons are 
discharged. At that point, the court cannot 
reseat a juror improperly stricken, and 
discharging the venire and beginning the 
process of jury selection anew may be 
compelled under the circumstances. Such 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
140 P.3d 1219 
140 P.3d 1219, 556 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 2006 UT 39 
(Cite as: 140 P.3d 1219) 
a result will generally serve neither the 
public policy Batson seeks to advance, nor 
the fair administration of justice. 
Id 
CONCLUSION 
f 47 We hold that a Batson challenge must be 
raised before the jury is sworn and before *1235 the 
remainder of the venire has been excused in order 
to be timely under Utah law. Because we hold that 
Valdez's Batson challenge was not timely, we 
reverse the court of appeals and remand this case to 
that court for consideration of the other issues 
raised by Valdez below. 
1f 48 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice 
DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice 
NEHRING concur in Chief Justice DURHAM'S 
opinion. 
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Addendum C 
1 After the ins t ruc t ions have been read, the State and the 
2 defense will once again have the opportunity to make closing 
3 s tatements to you to tell you what they think the evidence 
4 did show and why you should be persuaded or not be persuaded 
5 based on cer ta in elements of the evidence. 
6 As you try the case as jurors , you should remain 
7 alert and a t ten t ive and again not express an opinion until 
8 all of the ev idence is in, until you 've been asked to do so 
9 by re t i r ing to the jury room not to discuss the case with 
10 anyone and not talk to the attorneys or read or review 
11 anything else about the case. Okay, when I read your names , 
12 if you would p lease stand. 
13 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, permiss ion to approach 
14 the bench? 
15 THE COURT: Sure. 
I MR. MISNER; I think given the se r iousness of the 
charges w e ' r e probably going to need the record to make a 
Batson cha l l enge . Just wanted to make everybody aware 
because of the s ixteen perspective jurors that we had left after 
the for-causes , four were men, three were s t r icken by the state. 
MR. JOHNSON:Come again? 
MR. MISNER; We had four po ten t ia l male jurors and 
you struck th ree . 
MR. JOHNSON:Oh,wel l . 
MR. MISNER: So we just need the record . 
THE COURT: So, you also struck a Hispanic too. 
MR. MISNER: Yeah. 
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MR. JOHNSON: Okay, well that wasn't intentional on m 
part . 
MR. MISNER: Well, we just need to make a record and 
through the... 
THE COURT: Okay, alright, we can do that. 
MR.MISNER:Okay. 
16 THE COURT: Dorothy Faranakis, Janet Anderson, 
17 Tamara Solis, Judy Dearden, Connie Iverson, Janae Brochear, 
18 Terry Pierce-Rich, Carl (inaudible). 
Addendum D 
After the instructions have been read, the State and the 
defense will once again have the opportunity to make closing 
statements to you to tell you what they think the evidence 
did show and why you should be persuaded or not be persuaded 
based on certain elements of the evidence. 
As you try the case as jurors, you should remain 
alert and attentive and again not express an opinion until 
all of the evidence is in, until you've been asked to do so 
by retiring to the jury room not to discuss the case with 
anyone and not talk to the attorneys or read or review 
anything else about the case. Okay, when I read your names, 
if you would please stand. 
MR. ?: Your Honor, (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Sure. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held) 
THE COURT: Dorothy Faranakis, Janet Anderson, 
Tamara Solis, Judy Dearden, Connie Iverson, Janae Brochear, 
Terry Pierce-Rich, Carl [inaudible]. 
MR. JOHNSON: Can we approach a moment, Judge? 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held) 
THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, is this the jury which 
you've selected? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Misner and Ms. Chestnut, is 
this the jury that you selected? 
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1 MR. MISNER: Yes, Your Honor, thank you. 
2 THE COURT: Okay, will you each raise your right 
3 hand please? 
4 (Whereupon the jurors were sworn.) 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. If the eight of you would 
6 please come with the bailiff. He will show you the jury room 
7 and you can get settled and we'll start in about 15 minutes. 
8 And the remainder of you we want to thank you for 
9 being here, for coming, your attendance and we will excuse 
10 you at this time. 
11 (Whereupon the jury and the jury pool left the courtroom) 
12 THE COURT: Okay, the jury is out of the courtroom 
13 and prospective jurors have left. 
14 Mr. Misner, if you have want the benefit of the 
15 record at this point? 
16 MR. MISNER: Yes, Your Honor, thank you. 
17 We would just want to challenge the jury that's 
18 selected based on the Batson challenge, Your Honor. After 
19 for cause after looking at the top 16 jurors left which would 
20 be the only eligible jurors to choose from, four of those 16 
21 prospective jurors were men, three of them were stricken by 
22 the State. 
23 THE COURT: Okay, and your point being? 
24 MR. MISNER: Just that it appears that the State is 
25 attempting to strike men from the jury under Batson that 
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1 gender is a protected class with rights to serve on the jury 
2 and there has to be certainly an alternative valid and 
3 verifiable reason given for each strike once the Batson 
4 challenge has been made. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Johnson? 
6 MR. JOHNSON: Well, Judge, it was totally 
7 unintentional on the State's part. I did not keep a tally of 
8 male versus female and it should be interested to note that 
9 the victim on this case is a male, so it doesn't seem that 
10 that would quite comport with that. 
11 I would also hasten to add that if the Batson 
12 challenge is raised, there was only one other individual of 
13 color that is Angela Avila who was struck by the defense, so. 
14 THE COURT: Well, there were an inordinate number 
15 of females in this whole panel. 
16 MR. MISNER: Absolutely. 
17 THE COURT: Now you're talking of, I suppose about 
18 Mr. Tidwell and Mr. Worley? 
19 MR. MISNER: Tidwell, Worley and Mr. Jensen were 
20 the three. 
21 THE COURT: And who struck Mr. Brown? 
22 MR. JOHNSON: Who struck, I'm sorry. 
23 THE COURT: Brown? 
24 MR. JOHNSON: That was defense. 
25 MR. MISNER: That was defense. That was our first 
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1 strike, Judge. 
2 THE COURT: You struck a male on him. How many 
3 males did you strike then? 
4 MR. MISNER: They've got one -
5 THE COURT: Mr. Misner? 
6 MR. MISNER: Yeah, I'm counting. 
7 MR. JOHNSON: We struck three as well, Your Honor. 
8 MR. MISNER: Yeah, they struck three males as well. 
9 MR. JOHNSON: I mean, we're prepared to state the 
10 grounds for that if there's a Batson challenge being made 
11 against that. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you each do that then? 
13 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, we have the same reason 
14 for striking all four of the people that we struck and that 
15 was that all four were single with no children, and our jury 
16 pool that we want on this case are married with children. 
17 THE COURT: And Mr. Johnson, can you address those? 
18 MR. JOHNSON: Sure, I can articulate with Mr. 
19 Worley. I was looking for somebody with some education, it 
20 wasn't there. Mr. Jensen is a CEO from Harmons. It was my 
21 personal opinion, and I think the detective shares that with 
22 me that he's got a lot bigger fish to fry and I don't think 
23 he would give it the necessary attention that we needed to 
24 today. Mr. Tidwell was just an individual that from the very 
25 J beginning, I mean, gut instinct was not a person that 
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1 impressed me with anything that he could really bring to the 
2 jury panel. And then the fourth that the State struck -
3 MR. MISNER: Is not at issue. 
4 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, so that was my rationale, Your 
5 Honor. 
6 MR. MISNER: Our rationale, Your Honor, just so I'm 
7 clear is that just on the three men, but all four of them 
8 that we struck is for the exact same reason, including Ms. 
9 Avila. 
10 (Off the record discussion) 
11 THE COURT: Okay, are you satisfied? 
12 MR. MISNER: Well, I think the record has been 
13 made, Your Honor, I think at this point the Court simply 
14 needs to decide either to uphold the panel or strike the 
15 panel. 
16 THE COURT: Oh, I understand. 
17 MR. MISNER: We're satisfied with whatever the 
18 Court's decision is. 
19 THE COURT: Well, I have reviewed my notes that I 
20 took during the jury voir dire. I've looked at the pattern 
21 and way in which the preemptories were exercised by both 
22 sides. I do find that obviously it's a seven woman, one man 
23 jury, but based upon the reasons given and the conduct of 
24 both sides, I don't find a violation of Batson and jury is 



























this jury may proceed. 
MR. MISNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court's in recess 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: We are back on the record in State 
versus Rosa-Re. All parties are present and the jury has 
returned and we thank you again for being here. 
Mr. Johnson? 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please 
the Court, counsel. 
Good morning. When Joshua Bolanos went to bed at 
10:00 on Monday, March 28th, he really didn't expect much 
other than a great night's sleep. Earlier that night he met 
the defendant, Dennis Rosa-Re, who was introduced to Joshua 
as a co-worker of his fathers. His dad is a long-haul truck 
driver. That's the first time he met him, and he was 
introduced to him and was told that Dennis was to spend the 
night because his dad was a long-haul truck driver and then 
the next morning, very early in the morning, both Dennis and 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment XIV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process; 
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of 
officers; public debt; enforcement 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the propor-
tion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or giv^n aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
